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ANNEX  I Year:  1967 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  Germany  (Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia) 
Coal-field:  Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third· 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  985  41  4•54 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  383  29  1.77 
3)  Movement  of personnel  675  18  3.11 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  248  5  1.14 
5)  Falling objects  816  16  3.76 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5  - 0.02 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - . 
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  1  0.01 
12)  Other  causes  91  5  0.42 
TOTAL  3  205  116  216  908  597  14.770 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  -- of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.19  - - -
0.14  - - -
0.08  - - -
0  .. 02  - - -
o.o8  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.02  - - -
0.53  - - -Year:  1967 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS.  Country:  Germany  (Land  North 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  215  13  4.246 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  98  7  1.936 
3)  Movement  of personnel  138  4  2.725 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  53  - 1.047 
5)  Falling objects  133  2  2.627 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  - 0.020 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  28  - 0.553 
TOTAL  666  26  50  631  248  13.154 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Rhine/Westphalia) 
Coal-field:  Aachen 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.257  1  - 5 
0.138  - - -
0.079  - - -
- - - -
0.040  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.514  1  - 5 Year: 1967 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  160  8  4.834 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  94  9  2.840 
3)  Movement  of personnel  81  1  2.447 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  37  1  1.118 
5)  Falling objects  146  1  4.411 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  - - -
TOTAL  518  21  33  096  329  15.651 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  type  (a)* 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.242  - - -
0  .. 272  - - -
0.030  - - -
0.030  - - -
0.030  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.030  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.634  - - -Year:  1967 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:Rhine/Westph.and  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1  360  62  4-524 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  575  45  1.913 
3)  Movement  of personnel  894  23  2.974 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  338  6  1.124 
5)  Falling objects  1  095  19  3  .. 642 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5  - 0.017 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  2  0.003 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  1  o.oo6 
12)  Other  causes  119  5  0.396 
TOTAL  4  }89  163  300  636  074  14.599 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.206  - - -
0.150  - - -
0.076  - - -
0.020  - - -
o.o63  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.007  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.003  - - -
0.017  - - -
0.542  - - -Year:  1967 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage/Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
~an- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  57  1  6.634 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  33  2  3.841 
3)  Movement  of personnel  6  - 0.698 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  32  - 3.725 
5)  Falling objects  9  - 1.048 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  - 0.349 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  - 2  -
TOTAL  140  5  8  591  480  16.295 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.116  - - -
0.233  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
0"'233  - - -
0.582  - - -Year:  1967 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Charleroi/Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  91  10  5-361 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  61  1  3.593 
3)  Movement  of personnel  23  - 1-355 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  54  1  3.181 
5)  Falling objects  6  - 0.353 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.059 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp: 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  15  1  0.884 
TOTAL  251  13  16  975  000  14.786 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a), 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.589  - - -
0._059  - - -
- - - -
0.059  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.059  - - -
0.766  - - -Year: 1967 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  41  3  3·760 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  43  3  3-943 
3)  Movement  of personnel  15  - 1.376 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  25  - 2.293 
5)  Falling objects  4  - 0.367 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  - 0,183 
TOTAL  130  6  10  904  368  11.922  r 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0  .. 275  - - -
0.275  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.550  - - -Year: 1967 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per  million 
ities  worked  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  (to  third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  189  14  5.182 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  137  6  3·756 
3)  Movement  of personnel  44  - 1.206 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  111  1  3-044 
5)  Falling objects  19  - 0.521 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  - 0,110 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  17  3  0.466 
TOTAL  521  24  36  470  848  14 .. 285 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a)~ 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- as  under  ities 
place  dents  (a) 
0-384  - - -
0.165  - - -
- - - -
0.027  - - -
- - - -
- - - .. 
- - .....  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.082  - - -
0.658  - - -
...... 
0 Year:  1967 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Campine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  88  5  2.480 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  76  7  2.142 
3)  Movement  of personnel  21  - 0.592 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  52  1  1.465 
5)  Falling objects  14  - 0.395 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other  causes  3  - 0.084 
TOTAL  254  14  35  481  880  7.158 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.141  - - -
0.198  - - - - - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
0.395  - - -
..... 
...... Year: 1967 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  (whole  country) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  277  19  3.850 
2)  Haulage  a'irtl  transport  213  13  2.960 
3)  Movement  of personnel  65  - 0.903 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  163  2  2.265 
5)  Falling objects  33  - 0.459 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  - 0.056 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other  causes  20  3  0.278 
TOTAL  775  38  71  952  728  10.771 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.264  - - -
0.180  - - -
- - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.014  - - -
0.042  - - -
0,528  - - -Year: 1967 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  408  22  3.631 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  189  10  1.682 
3)  Movement  of personnel  173  1  1.540 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  236  2  2.100 
5)  Falling objects  203  1  1.807 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.009 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.009 
12)  Other  causes  19  - 0.169 
TOTAL  1  230  36  112  362  03~  10.947 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.195  - - -
0.089  - - -
0.009  - - -
0.018  - - -
0.009  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.320  - - -Year: 
Country: 
1967 
France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  147  4  4-055 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  73  2  2.013 
3)  Movement  of personnel  144  2  3,972 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  47  1  1.296 
5)  Falling objects  97  - 2.675 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.028 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 1  -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  4  - 0.110 
TOTAL  51~  10  36  258  464  14.149 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities 
decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0.110  - - -
0.055  - - -
0.055  - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.276  - - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
Year:  1967 
Country:  France 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E  C  S  C  COUNTRIES  . . . . 
~umber of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man-
as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as 
ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  112  3  3.205 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  90  4  2.576 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  82  - 2.347 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  226  - 6.467 
5)  Falling objects  88  1  2.519 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - 1  -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  5  0.029 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  11  1  0.315 
TOTAL  610  15  34  939  440  17-458 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Coal-field:  tentre-Mid  i 
axel.  Provence 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities 
decimal  as  under 
place 
dents  (a) 
o.oa6  - - -
0.114  - - - - - - -
- - - -
0.029  - - -
0.029  - - -
- - - -
0.142  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.029  - - -
0.429  - - -
) Year:  1967 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Co  l  f ·  ld  Whole  country 
a  -
1 e  :  texcl.  Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
l)  Falls of  ground  667  29  3.634 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  352  16  1.918 
3)  Movement  of personnel  399  3  2.174 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  509  3  2.773 
5)  Falling objects  388  2  2.114 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  1  0.011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamif, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  5  0.005 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - l  -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.005 
12)  Other causes  34  l  0,185 
TOTAL  2  353  61  l83  559  936  12.819 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities 
decimal  as  under 
place 
dents  (a) 
0.159  - - -
0.088  - - -
0.016  - - -
0.016  - - -
o.o11  - - -
0.005  - - -
- - - -
0.027  - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
0.332  - - -Year:  1967 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Su1cis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  7  - 5.580 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1  1  0.797 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  <2  2  - 1.594 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  17  1  13.552 
5)  Falling objects  8  - 6.377 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  4  - 3.189 
TOTAL  39  2  1  254  416  31.089 
(a}  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of  type  (a}. 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities 
decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
- - - -
0.797  - - -
- - - -
0.797  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
1.594  - - -Year: 
Country:  R~¥~erlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Limburg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man-
as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as 
ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  74  3  2.466 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  56  - 1.866 
3)  Movement  of personnel  23  - 0.766 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  25  2  0.833 
5)  Falling objects  26  - 0.866 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedagtp~ 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  21  - 0.700 
TOTAL  225  5  30  012  168  7.497 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  type  (a). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities 
decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a) 
0  .. 100  ....  - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.067  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - --
- - - -
- - - -
0.167  - - -1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
C  A  U  S  E 
Falls of  ground 
Haulage  and  transport 
Movement  of  personnel 
Machinery,  handling of 
and supports 
Falling objects 
Explosives  and  fumes 
Explosions  of  firedamp, 
or coal  dust 
Comparative  table of  number  of  persons 
incapacitated by  underground accidents  for eight weeks  or  longer 
in 1967 
per million man-hours 
Germany 
(Land North  Belgium  France  Italy  Rhine/West  ph.  (excl.Proven-
+  Saar)  ce) 
1967  1967  1967  1967 
4.524  3.850  3.634  5.580 
1.913  2.960  1,918  0.797 
2.974  0.903  2.174  1.594 
tools 
1.124  2.265  2.773  13.552 
3.642  0.459  2.114  6. 377 
0.017  0.056  0.011  -
- - - -
Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0.003  - 0.005  -
Underground combustion  and 
fires  - - - -
Inrushes  of water  - - - -
Electricity  0.006  - 0.005  -
Other causes  0.396  0.278  0.185  3.189 
TOTAL  14.599  10.771  12.819  31.089 
Netherlands 
1967 
2,466 
1.866 
0,766 
0.833 
0.866 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,700 
7.497 
Community 
1967 
4.060 
2.037 
2.354 
1.790 
2.638 
0.019 
-
0.003 
-
-
0.005 
0.337 
13.246 
1-4  .. C  A  U  S  E 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp, 
or coal  dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground combustion  and 
fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
Comparative  table of  accidents 
resulting in death within eight weeks 
in 1967 
per million man-hours 
Germany 
(Land North  Belgium  France 
Rhine/West  ph.  (excl.Proven-
+  Saar)  ce) 
1967  1967  1967 
0.206  0.264  0.159 
0.150  0.180  0.088 
0.076  - 0.016 
0.020  0.028  0.016 
0.063  - 0.011 
- - 0.005 
- - -
0.007  - 0.027 
- - -
- - 0.005 
0.003  0.014  -
0.017  0.042  0.005 
0.542  0.528  0.332 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1967  1967  1967 
- 0.100  0.192 
0.797  - 0.128 
- - 0.044 
1-C  .. 
0.797  0.067  0.024 
- - 0.036 
- - 0.002 
- - -
- - 0.012 
- - -
- - 0.002 
- - 0.004 
- - 0.015 
1.594  0.167  0.457 IMPLEMENTATION  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
(AS  AT  1.1.1968) 
ANNEX  II II,  3 
The  recommendations,  assessments,  principles and  reports  prepared by  the 
Mines  Safety Commission  since the beginning  of  its activities and  distributed to 
the Governments  and  other  interested bodies  in accordance with its terms  of  refer-
ence,  for further  action or for  information,  can usefully be classified in three 
groups  according to their date of  issue  : 
A - the recommendations  which are  included in the First  and  Second  Reports  of  the 
Mines  Safety Commission,  the  implementation of  which  was  published for the last 
time  on the basis of  the situation as  at  1.1.1966  given  in the Third Report, 
B  - the recommendations  which  are  included in the Third Report  of the  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  the  implementation of  which  was  published for the first time  on the 
basis of the situation as  at  1.1.1966  in the  same  Report, 
C - the  recommendations  which are  included in the Fourth Report  of  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission,  the  implementation  of  which  was  published for the first 
time  on  the basis of  the situation as at  1.1.1968 in this Report. 
c 
c 
~c 
~p 
E 
? 
A 
The  following  symbols  are used  in the tables  : 
The  national regulations  are already  in accordance with the recommenda-
tions 
The  recommendations  have  not  been  embodied  in regulations,  but  have 
been  implemented  de  facto 
New  regulations  in accordance with the  recommendations  have  been  drawn 
up  and  issued 
The  preparation of  new  regulations  in accordance with the recommenda-
tions is in hand 
The  preparation of  new  regulations  is being studied 
There  is uncertainty regarding the steps to be  taken 
The  national authorities have abstained from bringing their regulations 
into line with the recommendations. 
To  ensure  a  certain degree  of  uniformity with regular reports  on the meas-
ures taken,  the following  survey  shows  not  only those  recommendations  which  aim at 
modifying regulations  and to this end are indicated by  the  letters used for the pur-
pose,  but  also those which  need  not  be  implemented  by  means  of  regulations or  laws. 
These  latter call for  other modes  of  application. 
The  situation with regard to implementation of  the above-mentioned  recom-
mendations  and  proposals  is indicated,  with  explanatory  notes,  in the following ta-
bles. II,  5 
A  - Regular  report  on  the  implementation of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published  in the 1st  and  2nd  Reports 
I.- TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
N.R./Wph,  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968 
A,- ELECTRIFICATION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  elimination 
of  oil from  underground  electrical 
equipment  (1st  Report  of  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  p,  7  (German  text~~ 
2a)  Resistances  installed underground 
should  not  contain  any  combustible 
oil.  (Exceptions  are  allowed  for 
the starting-up resistances  of  C' 
large motors  driving water  pumps).  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  +  E  C'  .C' 
b)  Condensers  and  transformers  in-
stalled underground  must  not  con-
tain either combustible oil or 
dielectric substances  which  can 
give off  noxious  gases.  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  E  C'  C' 
- Otherwise effective measures 
should  be  taken  against  the dan-
gers  to workers  caused  by  the 
use  of  these devices,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  C'  C' 
c)  Switches  and  relays,  used under-
ground  and  operating  on  voltages 
below  1,100 V1  must  not  contain  C'+  C'+ 
any  flammable  oils.  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
d)  Protection  of  workers  against  dan-
gers  involved  in the use  of 
switches  and  relays,  which  work  on 
voltages  above  1,100 V  and  contain  2) 
flammable  oil.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  - c 
3.  Recommendation  to continue  re-
search  into the manufacture  of 
low-oil  or oil-less HT  switchgear 
and  protective relays which  can 
give riskfree service  in  gassy  l)  1)  2)  2)  3)  3)  C'+  C'+  2)  2) 
pits.  A  A  - - C'  C'  NRP  NRP  - -
Recommendation  to begin detailed 
investigation into the  degree  of 
increased safety which  can  be  a-
chieved,  when  prescribing  an  ex-
plosion-proof  housing  for  normally 
spark-producing  components  only, 
and  a  design  of  the ''increased 
safety"  type  for all other  equip- 1)  1)  2)  2)  3)  3)  4)  4) 
ment,  A  A  - - C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
4.  Extending  the use  of  low-oil  or 
oil-less  HT  switchgear  and oil-
less  HT  protective relays at  1)  1)  5)  5)  C'+  C'+ 
points where  there is  no  gas  risk,  A  A  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  c  c 
1)  cannot  be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
2)  not  applicable. 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1966  1968 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
E  E 
3)  devices  with satisfactory characteristics exist;  the  conditions  of  application must  be  speci-
fied. 
4)  approval  regulations  have  been  issued  for  equipment  in the  "increased safety"  category,  but 
the type  of  protection is left to the  individual  firms. 
5)  with  regard to the  approval  of  certain high-voltage switches. II,  6 
Nether-
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  lands 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 1.1. 
1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968 
II  - Recommendations  for  shotfiring leads 
(2nd  Report  of \Mines  Safety  Commission 
p,  10) 
2.  Recommendations  for  all shotfiring 
leads  ---
- Every  conductor  must  be  provided 
with  at  least  one  good-quality 
insulation,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  NRP  C'  c  c 
- All  connections  must  be  properly 
insulated,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  NRP  C'  c  c 
- Every  shot firing  lead  must  have 
the appropriate  degree  of  flexi-
bility.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  C'  c  c 
- The  conductors  must  be  of  such 
cross-sectional area that  they  do 
not  occasion  an  excessive voltage  C'+  C'+ 
drop,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  C'  NRP  NRP 
- The  shotfiring  leads  must  be  made 
up  and  laid so that  the risk of 
any  fault  current,  resulting  from 
contact  with metal  objects,  is  INRP  C'+ 
reduced,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  +  c  NRP 
- Before  any  shortfiring operation 
in  particular workings  and  before 
the  simultaneous firing  of  a 
fairly  large  number  of  shots,  the 
ohmic  resistance of  the circuit 
must  be  measured,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
a)  Temporary  shot firing  leads 
- Careful  inspection before each 
firing,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- Regular  and  thorough testing by 
an  expert  either at  the  surface 
or  in  an  underground  workshop,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  E  C'  C'  C' 
A  thorough  checking  must  consist  of 
at  least  : 
- a  careful  inspection of  the  lead 
over  its whole  length;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  C'+E  C'+E 
- measurement  of  the  insulation 
between the two  conductors,  if 
the  lead  consists  of  a  cable  or 
rubber-covered  lead;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- measurement  of  the  ohmic resist-
ance  of  the  lead,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  E  c  c  c 
b)  Permanent  shot firing  leads 
- Regular  and  thorough  checks  by  an  1)  1) 
expert.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  - -
- Written  record  of  every  thorough  2)  2)  1)  1) 
check,  with the date.  A  A  c  c  NRC  NRC  c'  c  E  C'  - -
1)  not  applicable. 
2)  seems  unnecessary  and  would  increase administrative work. I I,  7 
Nether-
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  lands 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 
1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968 
3.  Further  recommendations  for  perma-
nent  and  temporary  shot firing  leads 
used  in  gassy  mines 
- The  shot firing  leads  must  fulfi  1 
conditions  which  ensure suffi-
cient  safety with  regard  to  : 
a)  mechanical  strength  and  in 
particular tensile,  bending 
and  abrasion strength;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  IC+C'  C+C' 
b)  electrical insulation;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  C+C'  C+C' 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture) 
of  the  insulation  and  the  C'+  C'+ 
sheathing,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP 
Recommendation  that  checking  stand-
ards  which  correspond to the  condi- 1)  1) 
tions  be  laid down.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  - - NRP  NRP  E  E 
4.  Supplementary  recommendations  for 
permanent  shotfiring  leads  used  in 
gassy  pits 
- Permanent  leads  should  be  so ar-
ranged  that,  as  far  as  possible, 
damage  during firing  of  the shots  1)  1) 
or  from  other  causes  is avoided,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  - -
- If  the  shot firing  lead consists 
of  two  separate conductors,  these 
should  be  arranged sufficiently 
far  apart  and  in such  a  way  that  1)  1) 
inspection is possible.  c  c  CE  CE  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  - -
- In  shafts  and  dipping  roads,  the 
leads  must  have  an  adequate  me-
chanica! strength.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
III - Recommendations  regarding the  protec-
tion  of  underground distribution net-
works  against  the  danger  of  causing 
electric shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission,  p ,13  ~ 
I.  The  following  recommendations  refer 
only  to the  MT  networks  defined  be-
low;  Medium  Tension  (MT)  :  the nor-
mal  voltage  range  for  working 
equipment  used  underground with 
three-phase  A,C,  (between  380  and 
1 1100 V).  These  networks  should 
fulfil all the  recommendations  set 
out  below. 
These  recommendations  refer neither 
to the  HT  networks,  nor  to voltages 
which  are  lower  than the  medium-
tension  range  and  are used  for  par-
ticular purposes  (lighting,  dri  11-
ing apparatus,  telephone  installa-
tions,  etc.)  for  which  some  easing 
of  the restrictions may  be  allowed, 
Overhead  wire  networks  with  bare 
trolley wires  are also excluded, 
1)  not  applicable. II,  8 
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II.  Protection against  the risk of 
electric shocks 
A  - First  order  precautions 
(Protection against  direct 
contact  with  a  live phase) 
l,  Every  chance  contact  with  a 
live phase  should  be  avoid-
ed  as  far  as  possible  by 
laying the  conductor  out  of 
the  workmen's  reach,  by  in-
terposing effective bar-
riers,  by  sheathing the 
phase  or  by  insulating it,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2.  The  cables  and  leads  used 
in medium-tension  under-
ground  networks  should  be 
mechanically  protected ei-
ther  by  means  of  a  metal 
armouring  connected to the 
pilot  lead,  or  by  a  flexi-
ble envelope  of  the best  c  +  c  + 
possible design,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
- Leads  without  metal ar-
mouring  must  be  electri-
cally protected by  sepa-
rate or  common  protective 
screens,  which trip safe-
ty devices  in the event  1)  2) 
of  a  fault.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3.  Only  trained men  should  be 
allowed to  open the hous-
ings  of  accessible  live 
parts  (medium-tension volt-
age  range)  and  this only 
under  conditions which  have 
been  clearly  laid down  in 
advance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
4.  The  repair  and  maintenance 
of  the electrical equipment 
should  be  entrusted only  to 
trained personnel.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
B  - Second  order precautions 
(Equipotential  connection be-
tween  conductive  parts of the 
installation) 
1.  All  underground  networks 
must  be  provided with  an 
equipotential connection 
between  the  conductive  (not 
live in normal  operation) 
components  of  the  installa-
tion and  the other metal 
elements  connected thereto, 
such that  its conductance 
is sufficient to prevent 
the occurrence,  between  an) 
two  points accessible to a 
workman  simultaneously,  of 
a  voltage  higher than the 
weak  voltage.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
l)  in the case  of  new  cables, 
2)  for  old cables,  a  transitional delay until 1.4.1972  has  been  provided for. II,  9 
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2,  This  equipotential  connec-
tion  (protective  lead)  must 
ensure electric connection 
between the  conductive ele-
ments  of  the  installation 
over  the whole  length of 
the network,  It must  be 
maintained in satisfactory 
condition and  must  be  in-
spected as  often as  is ne-
cessary to ensure this.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3,  The  above-mentioned  equi-
potential connection  (pro-
tective  lead)  must  be 
earthed to at  least  one 
point  of  the  network  via  an 
earth connection  of  the 
lowest  possible resistance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
4,  This  earth connection must 
be  combined  with the star-
point  earth connection,  if 
a  star-point is employed,  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
c  - Third  order precautions 
(Reduction  of  fault  duration) 
1.  Any  fault  current  must  be 
considered dangerous  in un-
derground  medium-tension 
networks  if,  when  the fault 
current  flows  through  the 
protective  lead  and  con-
nected  conductive  campo-
nents  of  the  installation 
of  earth,  there is  produced 
between  any  two  points ac-
cessible to  a  workman si-
multaneously  a  voltage  ex-
ceeding the  level  of  a  weak 
voltage,  regardless  of 
whether  it occurs  between 
parts of  the  installation 
or  between  such  parts  and  NRP  NRP 
earth,  c  c  c  c  c  c  +  C'  +  C'  E  C'  c  c 
2.  If the star-point  of  a  net-
work  is earthed via  a  weak 
impedance  or without  any 
impedance,  so that  the  pre-
sumed  fault  current  is not 
restricted to  a  low  value, 
then the  network  must  be 
provided with safety de-
vices  which  can  at  any  time 
automatically  isolate the 
damaged  section of  the net-
work  from  the current 
source  (or  render it com-
pletely dead)  before  the 
fault  current  flowing 
through the protective  lead 
and  connected  conductive 
components  of  the installa-
tion or  earth reach  a  dan- 1)  1)  1)  1)  1)  1)  NRP 
gerous  value.  - - - - - - NRP  +  C'  E  E  NRP  NRP 
1)  not  applicable,  as  only  isolated circuits are used. Il'  10 
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- Since the  complete  or 
partial cutting-off  of  a 
line voltage  can  have  se-
rious effects  on  the  cur-
rent  supply  to  important 
equipment,  appropriate 
preventive measures 
should  be  taken, 
- Only  when  the  line  has 
been repaired  or the 
fault  eliminated,  or  at 
the  direction of  a  spe-
cialist who  has  taken all 
necessary  precautions, 
may  that  section of  the 
network  be  brought  under  NRP 
voltage again.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  +  C'  E  E  c  c 
3.  If the star-point  of  a  net-
work  is insulated or earth-
ed  via  some  impedance,which 
restricts fault  currents to 
a  low  value,  the network 
must  be fitted with  super-
vising devices  which are 
always  in  a  state of  readi-
ness  and  which  are  capable: 
a)  - either of  checking  the 
insulation of  the va-
rious parts  of  the 
network  and  of  indi-
eating any  damage  they  NRP 
may  have  suffered or  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  +  C'  E  E  ~RP  NRP 
- of  automatically cut-
ting off the  damaged 
section of  the  network 
from  its source  of 
current  (or  rendering 
the entire network  1)  1)  NRP 
dead).  - - c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  +  C'  E  E  ~RP  NRP 
- If  no  automatic cut-
off  device  is instal-
led,  the responsibil-
ity for  cutting-off 
should  be  entrusted to 
an  expert  who  can  in-
tervene as  soon as  the 
warning signal of  the 
supervisory  system is 
tripped or if the 
fault  assumes  major  1)  l) 
dimensions.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  C'  - -
- If cutting-off  has 
been necessitated  by 
one  of  the  two  cases 
cited above,  the res-
toration of  current 
may  be  accepted  only 
after repair of the 
line or elimination of 
the fault,  or  only  at 
the direct ion  of  an 
expert  official,  who 
has  taken all neces-
sary  precautions.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  C'  c  c 
1)  not  applicable,  as  only  isolated circuits are used. II,  11 
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- If no  automatic  cut-
off  device  is instal-
led,  the  rubber-cover-
ed  leads  of  mobile  rna-
chines  should  be fit-
ted with  an  automatic 
device  which  renders 
them  dead  as  soon  as 
there occurs  a  fault 
current  which  is caus-
ed  by  damage  to  the 
external  armour  or  by 
damage  to the  insula-
tion  of  an  individual 
phase;  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  c'  NRP  NRP 
b)  - or  of  automatically 
cutting off  the  damag-
ed  section of  the net-
work  from  its source 
of  current  (or  render-
ing the entire network 
dead)  as  soon  as  a 
double  fault  occurs 
leading to  a  dangerous 
fault  current  in the 
protective  lead  and 
connected  parts  of  the 
installation. 
- In  this  instance.  the 
current  may  be  switched 
on  again  only  after 
the  line has  been  re-
paired or  the fault  l)  l)  l)  1) 
eliminated.  - - - - NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  C'  NRP  NRP 
N.B.  The  comments  on  this  Recommendation 
are  given  in  the  Second  Report  of  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission,  PP.  15/22. 
B.- MECHANISATION  AND  LOCOMOTIVES 
I- Recommendations  regarding  locomotive 
equipment  {First  Report  of  the Safety 
Commission,  P.  20  (German  text)) 
1.  New  locomotives  must  be  equipped  with 
fixed,  rigid cabins  which  at  all 
times  give  the driver  a  clear  view 
along  the  roadway,  ahead  and  behind, 
without  any  need  for  him to put  his 
head  out  of  the cabin. (Fixed  cabins 
are understood  to cover  those  forming 
a  part  of  the structure or  which  can 
be  removed  only  laboriously  with  spe-~ 2)  c  2)  c  2  c  2)  c  4) c 4) 
cial tools.)  lA  3)  A  3)  A  3  A  3)  NRP  NRP  E  5) E  5)  c  c  c  c 
2.  The  locomotives  in service must  be 
modified  to meet  this requirement.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  E  c  c  A  A 
- locomotives  which  cannot  be  modi-
fied  should gradually  be  withdrawn 
from  service,  within  a  period to  be 
fixed  by  the  responsible  inspector-
ate,  or  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  E  c  c  A  A 
--
1)  not  applicable. 
2)  in the case  of  main-road  locomotives,  with the exception  of  "a clear view  behind",  which  is dif-
ficult  technically. 
3)  no  application made  to gateroad  locomotives,  because the risk of  accident  is increased. 
4)  for  trolley  locomotives. 
5)  for  other than trolley  locomotives. I I,  12 
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- only  be  used  in roadways  which  are 
wide  and  high  enough to eliminate 
accident  risk.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  E  A  A  E  E 
3.  For particular types  of  locomotive, 
or  in certain circumstances,  the re-
sponsible  Inspectorate can  grant  ex-
ceptions  from  the  above  regulations, 
provided that  safety regulations  of 
equal  stringency are  laid down.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  E  c  1)  A  E  E 
I I - Recommendations  regarding the neutrali-
sation of  Diesel-engine exhaust  fumes 
(First  Report  of  the Safety  Commission, 
P.  23  (German  text)) 
- General  use  of  better starters.  c  c  E  E  E  E  ?  ?  ?  ?  E  E 
- Intensified research  into improving 
combustion  by  the use  of  catalysts.  A  2'  A  2  EOP  EOP  E  E  ?  ?  ?  - 2)  A  2)  A  2) 
- Draw  attention to the existence of 
this process.  - 3  - 3)  - 3)  - 3) - 3)  - 3) - 3)  - 3)  - 3)  - 3) - 3)  - 3) 
- Continuation of  the research  into an 
automatic transmission  system,  which 
would  make it possible to give Diesel 
engines  a  constant  rpm. 
- Subsequent  resumption  of trials with 
the Houdry  carbon  monoxide  purifica-
tion process.  A  2)  A 2)  EOP  EOP  E  E  ?  ?  ?  - 2)  A  2)  A  2) 
C.- FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
I- Recommendations  regarding  equipment  for 
shafts in connection with the  preven-
tion  of  fires  (First  Report  of  the 
Safety  Commission,  p,  11  (German  text)) 
2.  Steps to prevent  any  accumulation  of 
grease  and  coaldust  (First  Report  of 
the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p,  15 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the  Con-
ference,  P.  54,  No,  2,  para.  c.) 
- Skip-winding  installations should 
as  far  as  possible be  sited only 
in upcast  shafts;  C'  C'  A  A 4)  E  E  A  A  C'  C'  c  c 
- Equipment  in  new  shafts should  be 
of  aerodynamic  form;  C'  C'  CE  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- all suitable steps  should  be  tal<en 
to avoid  in every  case  any  accumu-
lation of  dust  to ensure that  any 
such  accumulation  is removed,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
3.  Preferred siting of  methane-drainage 
lines  in upcast  shafts  (First  Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.l6 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the  Con-
ference,  p,  54,  No.  3,  Par.  d) 
- This  recommendation  of  the Confer-
ence  applies  particularly to pres-
sure  lines.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  A  - 5)  c  c 
1)  article 689  of  Mining  Regulations  provides  for  a  temporary  exemption  only, 
2)  not  suitable for  being  laid down  in  inspectorate regulations. 
3)  not  applicable. 
4)  all skip-winding  equipment  still in use  is installed in downcast  shafts. 
5)  no  methane-drainage  lines  in service. I I,  13 
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4,  Siting electric cables,  compressed-
air mains  and  gas-drainage  pipes 
(First  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  p,  16  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the Conference,  p,  54, 
No.  3,  par,  e) 
- electric cables  and  leads,  com-
pressed-air drains  and  gas-drain-
age  pipes  should  not  be  sited in 
the  haulage  compartment:  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  C'l)  C'  c  c 
- electric cables  should  not  all be 
sited in the  same  shaft,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  C'  C'  c  c 
II- Guiding  principles for  fighting  mine 
fires  by  sending  down  water  (Second 
Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
p,  26) 
1,  Installation 
a)  At  the top of  every  shaft  reach-
ing  to the surface there must  be 
a  device  which  can  send  down  at 
least  50 litres of  water  per min-
ute  and  per  square metre  of  shaft 
cross-section.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
b)  This device  must  be  installed in 
such  a  way  that  the  supply  of  wa-
ter can  at  no  time  be  seriously 
affected by  drawing-off  or  flow-
ing-away  of  water  at  other  points  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
c)  The  water  pipes  and  the spray 
jets must  be  set  in such  a  way 
that  they  are protected  from 
frost.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
d)  The  damming  device  or  devices 
must  be  set  outside the s.haft-top 
building in such  a  way  that  they 
can  be  operated at  any  time,  They 
must  be  marked  by  means  of  an 
instruction plate,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
2.  Fires  in down-cast  shafts 
a)  Immediate  measures 
- it is essential to indicate  in 
the fire-fighting plan the max-
imum  amount  of  water  which  can 
be  sent  down  each  of  the down-
cast  shafts,  without  creating 
additional dangers  for  the 
workers  by  its effects  on  the 
ventilation,  A 2)  A  2)  A  3  A 3)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- the  damming  device  which  can  be 
operated at this stage must  not 
release more  than this pre-
scribed quantity  of  water,  A  4  A  4)  A  3  A 3)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
1)  in the  case  of  electric cables  and  leads,  and  compressed-air  lines;  no  methane-drainage  pipes  in 
service. 
2)  there are doubts  as  to the practicability of  the  Recommendation;  minimum  water  quantities are 
laid down. 
3)  not  suitable for  incluSion  in regulations. 
4)  there are doubts  as to the practicability of  the  Recommendation. I I,  14 
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- until the  leader  of  the rescue 
operations  has  issued his  in-
structions  and  as  long  as there 
has  been  no  reversal  of  venti-
lation,  water  may  be  sent  down 
only  by  opening the  damming  de-
vice  prescribed for this pur-
pose,  A l)  A l)  A  2)  A 2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
b)  Measures  to be  taken  on  the  in-
structions  of  the  leader  of  res-
cue  operations 
- the  leader  of  the rescue  oper-
at ions  must  therefore decide 
- taking  into account  all the 
circumstances  - either to send 
down  an  increased  quantity  of 
water  - or  he  must  give  orders 
that  reversal  of  the ventila-
tion be  brought  about  or  en-
couraged,  A 2)  A 2)  A  2)  A  2  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- to facilitate the reversal  of 
the ventilation in the burning 
downcast  shaft,  once  this  has 
been  opened  and  the  main  fan 
stopped,  water  can  be  sent  down 
the upcast  shaft.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- if reversal of  the ventilation 
has  already  occurred  - either 
as  a  result  of  the  upward  cur-
rent  produced  by  the  heat  of 
the fire  or deliberately  -
downcast  shafts  should  be 
treated as  though  they  were  up-
cast  shafts.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- if the  calculated water  quanti-
ty  appears  to be  tJO  small to 
extinguish the fire  immediately, 
or  to hinder  its spread,  addi-
tiona! precautions  must  be 
worked  out  and  laid down  in the 
fire-fighting plan: 
- simultaneous  supply  of  water 
down  all downcast  shafts,  A 2) A 2)  A  2)  A 2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- partial shutting-off  of  the 
burning shaft at  surface 
level,  A  3)  A 3)  A  3)  A 3)  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- shut  underground  fire-doors, 
etc.  A  3)  A 3)  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
3.  Fires in upcast  shafts 
- in upcast  shafts,  water  may  be 
sent  down  only  on  the  instructions 
of  the  leader  of  the  rescue  opera-
tion.  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- as  long  as  there are still any 
worl{ers  in the pit,  only  so  much 
water  may  be  sent  down  as will 
allow the  fumes  of  the fire to 
continue to be  extracted whilst 
the water  is falling,  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
1)  there are  doubts  as  to the practicability of  the Recommendation. 
2)  not  suitable for  inclusion  in regulations. 
3)  not  suitable for  inclusion  in  regulations;  must  be  decided separately  in each  case. I I,  15 
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Note.  A  commentary  and  examples  (with dia-
grams),  regarding  the calculation of 
the effect  of  falling water  on  the 
ventilation are  given  in the  Second 
Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
PP.  29-50. 
I I I - Recommendations  for  the sealing-off  by 
dams  of  mine  fires  and  underground  com-
bust ion  (Second  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commissionz  P.  53~ 
Introductory  remark 
The  following  Recommendations  are not 
binding.  They  are  not  intended to give 
Inspectorates  "ready-made"  regulations; 
on  the  contrary,  it remains  for  the 
competent  authorities to decide  how 
these Recommendations  are to be  applied 
as  regulations,  circulars or  service 
instructions. 
These  Recommendations  refer  only  to the 
actual fighting  of  the fire  or  combus-
tion;  they  do  not  refer to the  measures 
to be  taken  as  a  matter  of  priority to 
rescue  men  following  the  outbreak. 
A  - When  a  mine  fire  has  broken  out  or 
underground  combustion developed, 
it is indispensable to take the 
necessary  preparatory steps for  any 
later sealing-off  by  dams  which  may 
be  necessary  while the direct fire-
fighting  operations are still go-
ing  on.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
- In  the event  of  sealing-off  by  dam 
becoming  necessary,  as  a  general 
rule the first  stoppings to be 
erected must  be  advance  dams.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
These  advance  dams  are  in fact  the 
real subject  of  the present  Recommen-
dations. 
B  - Structure and  erection of  the ad-
vance  dams 
1.  If there is no  risk of  explo-
sian  (1~: 
a)  to make  the advance  dams 
themselves  as air-tight as 
possible and to create the 
closest  possible seal between 
the  dam  and  the surrounding 
walls;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
b)  there is nothing  against 
shutting off first  of  all the 
intake air.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  R  E  c  c 
2. If there is a  risk of  explosion: 
a)  - to have  at all times  the 
most  precise  information 
possible  regarding the  de-
gree  of  e~plosion risks  in 
the fire  zone;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
1)  for  the  assessment  of  the risk,  see chapter A- II  a),  p.  52. I I,  16 
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- it may  be  necessary to pro-
vide  the  men  constructing 
the  advance  dams  with fire-
proof  clothing;  c  c  c  c  E  E  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
b)  - to ensure that  the advance 
dams  are as air-tight  as 
possible;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- to ensure that  they are 
strong  enough  to resist  an 
explosion;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
c)  - to ensure that  for the en-
tire period during  which 
the  stopping is being e-
rected,  there is sufficient 
ventilation of  the fire 
zone  to counter  as far as 
absolutely  possible the 
formation  of  an  explosive 
gas  mixture;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
d) - to ensure that all suitable 
measures  are taken to re-
duce  as far  as  possible the 
effects of  any  explosion 
which  may  occur;  (dust  bar-
riers, stone-dusting or 
water  trough barriers);  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
e) - to the greatest  possible 
extent,  the  dams  on  the in-
take  and  return sides 
should  be  sealed simulta-
neously;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- only the  number  of  workers 
and  members  of  the staff 
strictly necessary  for this 
work  should stay behind;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- as  soon  as the dams  have 
been  sealed,  the  danger  a-
rea  must  be  completely e-
vacuated,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
c - The  final  dams  must  be  durable, 
built  of  brick or  concrete under 
the  protection offered by  the ad-
vance  dams,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
Note:  Additional details to the foregoing 
Recommendations  are given  in a  Commen-
tary  (Second  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commission,  pp,  53/58). 
--II,  17 
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A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION  (SECOND  REPORT  OF  THE 
MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION,  P.  79~ 
I  - Pre-Entry  Medical  Examinations 
- All applicants  for  employment  at 
collieries should undergo  a  pre-
entry  medical  examination,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- This  must  establish that  the appli-
cant  shows  no  symptoms  rendering  him 
unfit  for  such  employment,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
The  pre-entry medical  examination 
must  include: 
- a  general  examination 
- such special examination as  may  be 
deemed  necessary for  the  purpose.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- The  examinations effected must  in-
elude,  as  regards the chest,  a  ra-
diograph  or  radiophotograph  of 
format  not  smaller than  70  x  70  mm;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  c  c  c 
- the latter to be  supplemented if 
need  be  by  a  standard-format  (1  :  1) 
radiophotograph;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  c  c 
- The  nature  of  these  examinations  and  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  c  c 
- the practical details,  together  with  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  c  c 
- the criteria on  which  the doctor 
should base his findings,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  c  c 
- should be  defined  by  medical  experts  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  c  c 
- In the  case  of  recruitment  for  work, 
whether  below  or  above  ground,  where 
the  worker  will be  exposed to a  dust 
hazard,  the  examination  must  show 
a  normal  pulmonary  image,  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  •C'  E  C'  c  c 
- The  concept  of  normal  pulmonary  im-
age  must  be  defined  by  medical  ex-
perts.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
- These  are to be  regarded  as  minimum 
medical  recommendations. 
- The  points  concerning the  number  anc 
type  of  examinations to be  carried 
out, 
- the effecting of  radiological  exam-
inations 
- the definition of  the  normal  pulmo-
nary  image 
- are subject  to review  in each 
country 
- whenever this is felt to be  appro-
priate  in the  light  of  progress  in 
medical  and  radiological  knowledge 
- working  conditions,  and 
- preventive measures, I I>  18 
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II - Special  Examinations 
l, The  object  of  special medical  exam-
inations should  be  to establish -
taking  into account,  according to 
circumstances,  the  opinions  of 
- the training  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- vocational-guidance  and  applied 
psychology  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
- and  other  services  concerned 
a  worker's  fitness  for  certain 
specific occupations,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2.  Such  examinations  are essential  in 
the  case  of  jobs 
- which,  either in themselves  or 
owing  to the conditions  under 
which  they  are performed,  involve 
a  special hazard to the  worker 
himself  or to others  as  regards 
health and/or  safety,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- which  involve special health or 
safety  requirements, 
- or  which  demand  particular physi-
cal aptitudes  or  characterologi-
cal qualities.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
3.  No  attempt  has  been  made  here  to 
list  in full the cases  in which 
special  examinations  are  necessary, 
this being  left to the  competent 
authorities  in  each  country,  Exam-
ples  include: 
- winding  enginemen, 
- staple pit  enginemen, 
- motormen  (drivers  of  locomotives, 
mobile  haulers  and  surface vehi-
cles), 
- workers  assigned to hot  workings, 
- all those  employed  on  cage  han-
dling. 
III - Routine  examinations  during  employment 
A  - Periodic health  checks 
- The  object  here  is to establish 
whether  the  subject  is still fit 
for  duty,  - - CE  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- to detect  any  symptoms  of  occupa-
tiona! disease at  the earliest 
possible stage,  - - c  c  c  c  c  c  - C'  c  c 
- where  appropriate to help super-
vise the subject's health  general-
ly,  - - c  c  c  c  c  c  - C'  c  c 
- All  personnel  should  undergo  such 
CEl)  CEl)  check-ups  at  intervals,  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1)  fulfilled for  underground workers;  fulfilled only  for  certain categories  of  surface workers. I I,  19 
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- The  interval is fixed at  two  years  c  c  CE  NRC  c  c  cl) cl)  c2>  c2)  c  c 
- The  interval is reduced  for  work-
c3)  c3)  ers under  21.  c  c  CE  NRC  c  c  c  c  E  E 
- The  interval should  be  considered  4)  4)  4)  4) 
as  a  maximum figure,  c  c  - - - c  c  c  c  c  c 
This  interval can also be  reduced: 
- if the state of  health  of  a  worker 
indicates that  such  a  reduction  is 
desirable;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  E  C'  C'  C' 
- in relation to the type  of  work 
performed;  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  c  c 
- because  of  the  nature of the  place 
at  which  the work  is being  done,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  c  c 
B  - Medical  examinations  on  specific 
occasions 
1.  In the  case  of  reassignment 
- Workers  whom  it is proposed 
to assign to jobs  involving 
hazards  not  previously  taken 
into account  for  the  man  con-
cerned  should  be  re-examined,  c  c  CE  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  E  E 
2,  Medical  examination following 
absence  from  work 
- Where  a  man's  return to work 
after an  illness or  accident 
involves risk to the safety 
of  himself  or others,  he  may 
be  subjected to  a  special ex- NRP  NRP 
amination,  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  +C'  +C'  E  E  C'  C' 
- the  type  and  extent  of  which 
should  be  fixed  in each  case 
according to the  circum-
stances.  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
1)  the  interval is one  year. 
2)  article 648  of  Inspectorate Regulations  provides for  an  interval of  one  year. 
3)  for  workers  under  18  years  of  age. 
4)  not  applicable, II,  20 
B  - Regular  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published  in the Third  Report 
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I  - Recommendations  regarding  the  protec-
tion of  underground  electrical net-
works  against  fire  and  firedamp-ex-
plosion risks  (Doc,  1156/6174) 
1.  Recommendations  regarding the pro-
tection of  underground  electrical 
networks  against  fire  risl~: 
A  - First-order precautions  -
avoidance  of  fire risk 
1)  Avoidance  of  excessive 
heating  of  cables  in normal 
use  by  providing  adequate 
conductivity.  Avoidance  of 
unforeseen  local heatings 
by  the use  of  suitable de-
signs  and  by  proper super-
vision.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c 
2)  Reduce  the possibility of 
faults  and  short-circuits 
occurring between  conduc-
tors,  or  between  conductor 
and  earth,  by  adequate  in-
sulation or  proper  spacing 
of  the  conductors,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
B - Second-order  precautions -
protection against  the effects 
of  a  heating  or  a  fault 
1)  Use  of  heat-stable insula-
tions.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRF  NRP  C'  C' 
2)  Use  of  protective sheathing 
for  equipment  and  for  ca-
bles 1  made  of  flame-resist-
ant  and  non-propagating  NRC 
cl)  cl)  material.  c  c  +  E  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
- Use  of oil as  a  non-con-
duct or  only  if no  fire 
risk for  the workers  is 
involved,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C' 
3)  Accumulations  of  flammable 
or  combustible materials 
and  pipelines for  combusti-
ble  gases  should  be  sited 
well  away  from  electrical  c  +  C'+  C'+ 
equipment.  NRC  c  C+C' C+C'  c  c  NRI  NRP  C'  C' 
c  - Third-order  precautions  -
measures  regarding the  network 
1)  Automatic  protection  of 
networks  against  abnormal 
overloads.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
1)  with  respect  to armoured  cables. 
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2)  Automatic  protection of  net-
works  against  short-circuit; 
these  protective devices 
must  be  capable  of  handling 
the  maximum  short-circuit 
current  at their point  of  c  +  c  + 
installation.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
Selecting and  regulating of 
these devices  in relation to 
the  minimum  short-circuit 
current  which  can  occur at 
the  end  of  the section they  c  +  c  + 
protect.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
3)  Steps to give effective pro-
tection against  low-current 
faults,  which  might  get  past 
the  above-named  protective 
devices  and  cause  dangerous  C'+  C'+ 
heatings,  NRP  NRP  ?  1)  NRP  NR.P  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
2,  Recommendations  for the protection 
of  underground electrical networks 
against  firedamp-explosion  risks 
A.  First-order precautions  - pre-
vention  of  accumulations  of 
firedamp 
1)  The  firedamp  content  at  the 
site of  the electrical appa-
ratus  must  be  kept  within the 
limits prescribed by  the 
Inspectorate.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
2)  The  ventilation situation 
must  be  checked before any 
new  installation or  extension  C'+  c  + 
of electrical equipment.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
3)  There  must  be  a  thorough  in-
vestigation of  the  possible 
consequences  of  any  altera-
tions  in working  method,  of 
ventilation or  gas  omission, 
which  might  cause  problems  in 
the vicinity of  electrical 
equipment,  c  c  c  c  NRF  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
B,  Second-order  precautions - pro-
tection against  ignition 
1)  In  gassy  workings:  use  of 
electrical equipment  which  is 
permitted  by  the  Inspectorate 
only  under  its own  specified  c  +  c  + 
conditions.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
2)  The  electrical equipment  must 
be  installed,  used,  super-
vised  and  maintained  in such 
a  way  as to keep it flame- c  +  c  + 
proof,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
All cables must  be  of  a de- c  +  c  + 
quate mechanical  strength,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
All  cables  must  be  installed 
and  maintained without  damage,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
1)  no  suitable devices for  the determination of  these faults available. I I,  22 
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c.  Third-order  precautions  -
cutting  off  the circuit 
1)  Networks  must  be  designed  and 
installed in  such  a  way  that 
any  fault  current  which  may 
arise between  phase  and  earth 
is reduced to  a  l_ow  value  or  c  +  c  + 
quickly  cut  off.  NRP  NRP  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
2)  A  protective relay,  prefer-
able  automatic,  must  be  pro-
vided  against  between-phase  c 1)+ c 1)+  C'+  C'+ 
faults  and earth faults.  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
3)  Precautions  must  be  taken to 
avoid accidents  when  faults 
are  being  sought  or dealt  c 1)+  CC'+  CC'+ 
with.  c  c  NRP  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
4)  Protection must  be  given to 
leads  without  metallic 
sheathing,  and to those  which 
supply  movable  machines,  by 
means  of  individual  or col-
lective screens  which  bring  a 
protective device  into opera- c  +  c  +  C'+  C'+ 
tion if  a  fault  occurs.  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
5)  If the  firedamp  content  rises 
above  the  prescribed  limit, 
all the sections of  the net-
work  involved  must  be  cut  off.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
Issuing instructions to main-
tain in operation certain rna-
chines  which  provide ventila-
tion,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  C+C'  C+C' 
Restarting  only  when  the 
firedamp  content  has  fallen 
below the permissible value, 
and  only  on  the  orders  of  a  c  +  c  + 
trained person.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
Supplementary  precautions for  pits 
liable to sudden  outbursts  of  gas 
1.  Risk  of  damage  by  particles  pro-
jected by  an  outburst  of  gas 
- The  threatened zones  in which 
projection  can  occur  should  not 
be  electrified.  A  A  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  2)  c  2) A 3)  c  3)  A  A 
- The  electrical equipment  and 
cables  should  be  protected 
against  heavy  blows.  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  A 3)  c  3)  c  c 
- The  electrical equipment  should 
be  designed  to give  adequate 
robustness,  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  A 3)  c  3)  c  c 
1)  available for  movable  equipment. 
2)  the.use  of  electricity is forbidden  in pits liable to sudden  outbursts  of  gas,  excepting for 
lighting and  shot-firing.  Exceptions  can,  however,  be  approved  by  the senior mining  engineers: 
when  using armoured  cables,  telephone  installations and  methanometers  in  intake airways  - pro-
vided  that  no  damage  is  likely to occur  as  a  result  of  a  gas  outburst  - and  also in main  return 
airways, 
3)  No  pits liable to sudden  outbursts  of  gas.  However,  in pits or  parts of  mines  which are consid-
ered to be  liable to sudden  outbursts  of  gas,  the use  of electricity,  excepting for  lighting 
purposes  and  portable  lamps,  must  be  authorized  by  a  senior mining  engineer,  subject to the 
observance  of all other measures,  precautions or restrictions which  might  be  included  in the 
authorization such  as  for  example  the  above-mentioned  recommendations. I I,  23 
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2.  The  risk of  firedamp  concentrations 
- Increased ventilation  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  A  1) c  1)  c  c 
- Use  of  remote-indicating methano-
meters  or  ventilation-fault  de-
tectors  which  can  cut  off the  C'+  c  + 
threatened section of  the  network,  C'  C'  E  2) E  2)  E  E  c  c  A  1' c  1)  NRP  NRP 
- Relaxation shot-firing only after 
all equipment  has  been  switched 
off,  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  c  c  A  l  c  l)  - -
3.  Supplementary electrical precau-
tions  ---
a)  Preferable use  of  a  starpoint 
earthed via  a  strong  impedance, 
e,g,  by  means  of  an  insulation 
detector,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  A l) C  1)  NRP  NRP 
b)  Quickest  possible automatic  pro-
tection of  the network against 
all insulation faults,  even if 
formed  by  resistances  between  c  +  c  +  c  +  c  + 
phase  and  earth.  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  c  c  A l) C  l)  NRP  NRP 
II - General  guidelines for  the  opening-up 
of  sealed-off fire areas  (Doc,  130473/ 
64l 
I.  GENERAL  3)  3) 
Special  reasons  for  opening-up  a 
district sealed-off after  a  fire: 
- recovery  of  bodies 
- salvage  of  material 
- recovery  of  roadways  and  workings 
- reduction  of  the sealed-off area 
- inspection of  the district,  and, 
if necessary, 
- direct  fire-fighting, 
The  following  hazards  can  arise 
from  reopening  a  sealed-off dis-
trict: 
- release of  co,  foul air and  hot 
damp  air, 
- explosion of  firedamp  or fire gas 
where  the fire is not  yet  ext in-
guished, 
- recrudescence  of the fire,  which 
need  not  necessarily occur  imme-
diately,  but  even after some  time 
has  elapsed, 
Recrudescence  of  the fire can  occur 
only  when  fresh air reaches the 
seat  of the fire,  so that  with all 
operations  involved  in reopening  a 
fire area it is of  prime  importance 
to inspect  the  individual air cur-
rents  constantly,  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
1)  no  pits liable to sudden outbursts  of  gas,  (See  note  3,  previous  page) 
2)  already applied  in individual cases. 
3)  the  opening-up  of  fire areas  is carried out  on  the responsibility of  the manager,  who  prepares 
a  reopening  plan  - taking  into account  the scale and  type  of fire and the ventilation situation 
in the fire area  - in collaboration with the  Main  Rescue  Station,  The  action  plans  of  the  Main 
Rescue  Stations  very  largely  embody  the guidelines  laid down  in Doc,  1304/3/64  . II,  24 
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All  places  suspected of  having  been 
seats of  fire  or heatings  must  be 
ascertained with the utmost  speed.  E  NRP  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
II.  BASIC  RULES 
Sealed-off districts may  be  reopen-
ed  only after the  competent  author-
ities have  been notified or  have 
given their permission.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  1)  c  1)  C'  c  1)  C'  C' 
Before  opening  commences,  gas  sam-
ples  must  be taken  from  the fire 
area,  at  each stopping and  from all 
sampling  pipes.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C'  C' 
The  gas  samples  are analysed and 
the results assessed  from  the point 
of  view  of  explosion risk in the 
sealed-off  area  and the state of 
the seat  of  the fire.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C'  C' 
The  cooling-off  time  of  the seat  of 
the fire  must  be taken into account.  E  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If possible,  the sealed-off dis-
trict should  be  inspected before 
any air is circulated or  any  opera-
tions are started.  A  A  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before  opening  commences,  a  plan 
should  be  drawn  up jointly with the 
Main  Rescue  Centre.  c  c  NRP  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
This  plan  must  cover the following 
points: 
- the  method, 
- nature,  scope  and  order  of  opera-
tions, 
- direction  and  supervision, 
- checking  of  the ventilation sys-
tern and  of  the  composition of  the 
air,  - communications,  - preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition of  access 
to and  remanning  of  endangered 
workings, 
- deployment  of  the Rescue  Team, 
- connection and disconnection  of 
electrical equipment  and  cutting-
off the supply of  electricity in 
both  equipment  and  part  of  net-
work  concerned, 
- opening  and  closing of  the  com-
pressed air,  water  and  methane-
drainage  pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of  the fire area  in 
emergency.  c  c  c  c  C'  .  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  method to be  adopted  for re-
opening  sealed-off districts de-
pends  on  the  presence  or  otherwise 
of 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures 
which  remain  non-explosive  on 
dilution with air, 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures 
which  may  become  explosive  Oil; 
dilution with air,  or 
- explosive  gaseous  mixtures. 
1)  applies only to the  opening-up  of  fire areas after particularly  large fires Recommendations  by the Commission 
Fire areas  may  be  opened  at  one 
point  or at  several points,  In  the 
latter case,  a  continuous direct 
circulation of  air is automatically 
established and  the fire area is 
permeated with  fresh air,  An  exam-
ination should  be  made  of  the ef-
fects  of  the  opening  of  the area  on 
the ventilation system of  the pit 
II,  25 
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as  a  whole  and  within the fire area  C 
~--~----~--~--~~--4----4----4----4----+----+----~--~  C C'+C  C'+C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
A sealed-off district may  be  re-
opened  by 
- breaching  one  or  more  stoppings 
(with  or without  the use  of  an 
air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry into the 
fire-area. 
Before  opening  a  sealed-off  area, 
provision should  be  made  for  im-
mediate reclosure if necessary,  ~-c--r-_c~r--C~r--c_,  __  c  __ ~  __  c-4  ___  C_'+-_C  __  '+---C-'+--C-'-+--C--'~-C-'~ 
Stoppings  may  be  opened  only  on  the 
instructions of  the manager  under-
ground  and  under  the constant  su-
pervision of  personnel  appointed  by 
him,  C  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C  C'  C' 
r---~--~r---~--~----4----4----+----4----+----+----~--~ 
Workings,  into which  the  opening  of 
a  stopping  may  release toxic gases 
or  foul air,  or where  there  is  a 
risk of  explosion,  must  be  evacu-
ated  and  put  out  of  bounds  to per-
sonnel before  opening.  ~-c--r-_c~r--c~r--c_,  __  c  __  '~--c_'+---c-4  __  c  __ +-__  c_'+--c-'-+--c--~-c~ 
Since conditions  in the district, 
the state of  the seat  of  the fire 
and  the risk of  gas  explosion may 
change  during the  opening  operation 
the  composition  of  the fire  gases 
or  fumes  must  be  checked  at  regular 
intervals.  ~~c--r-_c~r-~c~r-~c_,  __  c~~~c-4--~c-4  __  c~+-~C-'+-~C~'-+--c~·~~C-'~ 
The  kind  and  number  of  samples  and 
the  points at  which  they  are to be 
taken should be  fixed  in advance,  C  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
~--~--~r---~--~----4----4----+----4----+----+----~--~ 
In doing  so,  the possibility of  gas 
accumulations  forming  should  be 
allowed for.  (In general,  the for-
mation  of  gas  layers is fostered  by 
low air velocities and  differences 
C  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C  c  c  in temperature,)  C 
r---+---;----r---+--~r---+---;----r---+--~~--~--~ 
Where  a  stopping is  opened  in the 
knowledge  that  a  fire is not  yet 
extinguished,  or where  the fire is 
revived as  a  result,  the area  in 
question  must  be  resealed at  once, 
if the composition  of  the fire 
gases  or  fumes  changes  in such  a 
way  that  an explosion hazard  might 
arise. 
With  non-explosive  gas  mixtures  in 
the fire area,  this is necessary 
only  if extinguishing operations 
seem unlikely to succeed. 
It  is the responsibility  of  the 
Rescue  Team  to open  and  inspect 
fire areas,  even after they  have 
been ventilated, 
c 
c 
c 
c  c 
c  C' 
c  c 
c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' II,  26 
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On  the  intake side,  breaching  of 
stoppings  need  not  be  carried out 
by  the  Rescue  Team  provided that 
no  gas  hazard  is to be  reckoned 
with,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  deploying the Rescue  Team, 
allowance  should  be  made  for  the 
adverse  climatic conditions which 
are  likely to obtain at  any  point 
where  they  may  be  employed.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
III.  OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIX-
TURES  ---
1.  Opening-up  one  side  only 
A  sealed-off district  contain-
ing  non-explosive  gas  mixtures 
may  be  opened  on  one  side even 
if the fire is not  yet  ext in-
guished, 
It  must  first be established 
whether  the  remaining  stoppings 
and  seals are sufficiently air-
tight  and that there is no  risk 
of  releasing fire  gases,  in 
particular carbon  monoxide  in 
other parts of  the working, 
which  may  be  connected with the 
fire area,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If the  stopping to be  opened  is 
on the return side,  special at-
tention should  be  paid to the 
release  of  CO  or  of  other toxic 
or  dangerous  gases  or foul  air,  c  c  C'  c  c  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  decision  as  to whether to 
carry  out  operations  in the 
fire  area without  ventilation 
air or with auxiliary ventila-
tion depends  on  the  purpose  of 
the  reopening  of  the area,  the 
expected duration  of  the  Rescue 
Team's  operations  and  the  pos-
sible hazards  involved,  Auxil-
iary ventilation is especially 
desirable for  extended  opera-
tions within the fire area, 
a)  Working  without  ventilation 
air.  especially  behind  an 
airlock,  has  the advantage 
of  eliminating the risk of 
reviving the fire,  When  car-
rying  out  extinguishing 
operations without  ventila-
tion air and  under  unfavour-
able air conditions,  it is 
advisable first to set  up 
water  sprinklers  or  nozzles 
and to put  these  into opera-
tion only  after the  Rescue 
Team  has  left the fire area,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is 
used,  it should  preferably 
be  by  suction.  c  c  A  1)  A 1)  C'  C'  C'  C'  ?  2)  - 2)  C'  C' 
1)  experience  hitherto has  shown  that  blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable,  to ensure that 
no  explosive  gases  are  sucked  in by  the auxiliary fan 
2)  the  use  of  blowing  auxiliary ventilation is preferred II,  27 
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It  is advisable to isolate 
the fire  area ventilated by 
an  auxiliary  fan  from  the 
non-ventilated section by 
means  of  an  auxiliary  stop-
ping if the seat  of  the 
fire is situated in the 
non-ventilated section.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of  air 
round  the sealed-off area 
A  sealed-off area containing 
non-explosive  gas  mixtures  may 
be  ventilated only if it is 
likely that  the fire is ex-
tinct.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
While  ventilation is being es-
tablished,  a  Rescue  Team  wear-
ing breathing  apparatus  may 
enter the fire area to examine 
conditions within it and to 
extinguish any fires.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
IV.  REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY 
BECOME  EXPLOSIVE  ON  DILUTION  WITH 
AIR  --
l.  Opening  on  one  side  only 
A  sealed-off  area containing 
gas  mixtures  which  may  become 
explosive  on dilution with  air 
may  be  opened  on  one  side  onlyj 
even if the fire is not  yet 
extinguished. 
It is,  however,  essential to 
install a  tight airlock in 
front  of  the stopping  -to  be 
opened,  so  as  to ensure  an ef-
fective air seal.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
It must  first  be  checked 
whether  the  remaining  stop-
pings  and  seals are suffi-
cient ly air-tight  and  that 
there is no  risk of  releasing 
fire gases,  in particular car-
bon  monoxide,  into other parts 
of  the workings  which  may  be 
connected with the fire area.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If the  stopping to  be  opened 
is  on the return side,  partie-
ular attention must  be  paid to 
the possibility of  releasing 
co,  CH4  or  foul air  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
All  operations  must  be  carried 
out  without  ventilation air.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
There  must  be  continuous  sam-
pling  and  evaluation  of  the 
results  of  analysis to check 
whether  the  gas  mixture  re-
mains  non-explosive.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For  extinguishing operations, 
see  section III.l. II,  28 
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If the size of  the sealed-off 
area  is to be  reduced,  a  new 
explosion-proof  stopping must 
be  erected,  In  order to be 
able to erect this stopping 
under  tolerable climatic con-
ditions  and  possibly without 
wearing breathing apparatus, 
auxiliary ventilation may  have 
to be  provided.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For  this purpose,  an auxiliary 
stopping  must  first  be  erected 
and  sealed in an unventilated 
atmosphere,  (Before  construct-
ing the main  stopping,  it 
should  be  considered whether 
to erect  several successive 
auxiliary stoppings,  according 
to the possible hazards,)  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  section of  roadway  thus 
recovered must  then  be  venti-
lated by  an  auxiliary fan  so 
as to create suitable air con-
ditions for the erection of 
the main  stopping.  c'  c'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  starting up  the auxiliary 
ventilation,  it must  be  remem-
bered that  the  gas  mixture  be-
comes  explosive  on  dilution 
with air, It is therefore es-
sential to ensure that  there 
is  no  source of  ignition in 
the  workings  to be  ventilated,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In addition,  it is essential 
to make  certain that the fan 
used  cannot  cause  any  risk of 
ignition,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C''  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before starting up  the auxil-
iary ventilation,  all workings 
likely to be  exposed to the 
hazards  of fire gases  or  ex-
plosions  must  first  be  evacu-
ated  and  access thereto pro-
hibited,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Electrical equipment  must  be 
cut  off  from the  power  supply,  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'l C'l)  C'  C' 
In addition,  the ventilation 
must,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
regulated so that  no  explosive 
gas  mixtures  can be  released 
over  long  distances,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For this purpose,  the quantity 
of air circulated should,  if 
necessary,  be  increased,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2,  Opening  on  two  sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of air 
through the fire area 
This  method  of  opening auto-
matically results in the for-
mation  of  a  through air-cur-
rent  in the  open district,  but 
not  necessarily  in other  parts 
of  the district.  The  method 
can  be  used  only  if there are 
no  remaining signs  of  fire  in  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
the district.  c  c 
1)  spec1al attent1on 1s  drawn to the fact  that  the  fan  must  be  switched off. II,  29 
Nether-
N.R./lfph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  lands 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 1.1. 
1966  1968 1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968 
In addition,  a  period  long 
enough for the seat  of the fire 
to cool off must  have elapsed 
since the estimated time  of 
extinction,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If possible,  the Rescue  Team 
should carry out  an  inspection 
in an unventilated atmosphere,  A  A  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Failing this,  the results of 
the snuffle pipe tests should 
be used to determine the condi-
tion of the seat  of the fire.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Furthermore,  it should be  con-
sidered in such cases whether 
the method  described in section 
IV.l might  not  be  preferable,  E  NRP  - 1)  C'  C'  C'  C'  cr  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In each case,  it is essential 
to check the likelihood of  a 
recrudescence of  the fire dur-
ing ventilation,  by  means  of 
fire gas  samples.  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
This applies particularly in 
the case  of  a  much-branched 
district.  C'  C'  c•  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before ventilating the fire 
area,  all workings  exposed to 
the hazards  of fire gases  or 
explosions  of fire gases  or 
fire-damp  when  the stopping is 
opened  must  be  evacuated,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
All electrical installations in 
these workings  must  be  cut  off 
from the power  supply.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
On  safety grounds,  it is advis-
able to open the return stop-
ping first,  E  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
After the Rescue  Team  has with-
drawn to less dangerous  zones, 
the  intake stopping should be 
opened,  E  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  ventilating the fire area, 
the quantity  of air and the 
content  of  inflammable  gases  in 
the air-current circulating 
through the fire area,  and  in 
the current  into which it sub-
sequently flows,  should  be 
checked,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  two air-currents should be 
mutually adjusted in such a 
manner  as to ensure that  no ex-
plosive mixture  of  gases  is 
present  over  long distances 
after their junction.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Access to the fire area is pro-
hibited until it has  been ven-
tilated.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  not  applicable. II,  30 
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v.  OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING 
EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be  re-
opened,  either on  one  side  or  on 
two  sides,  if the  presence  of  ex-
plosive  gas  mixtures  behind  the 
stoppings  is established.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
VI.  OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition  of  the  air  in fire 
areas  flooded  to extinguish the  fire 
must  be  checked  after draining.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In  workings  with solid coal,  allow-
ance  must  be  made  for  the  increased 
hazard  of  spontaneous  ignition after 
drainage. 
Where  fire  areas  have  been  isolated 
by  local  flooding  instead of  by 
stoppings,  the rules mentioned  in 
section  I  to  V  should  be  observed, 
insofar  as  applicable,  when  opening 
a  district.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
VII.  REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating  a  fire  area, 
workings  may  not  be  manned  until 
a  Rescue  Team  has  established that 
all workings  are  free  of  noxious 
gases.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If the  fire  area  is merely  being 
reduced  in size,  workings  free  of 
noxious  gases  may  be  manned  only 
when  the  remainder  of  the  fire-
area  has  been  sealed-off  by  permanent 
stoppings.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' II,  31 
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III - Guidelines  for  the  construction of 
advance  fire  stoppings  from  plaster 
(doc.  4928/63/2) 
In  all cases where  it is possible 
and  advantageous,  the erection of 
plaster stoppings to seal off fires 
and  heatings  is recommended. 
Is this process  applied  in practice 
as  laid  down  in  the  guidelines  1)  2)  2) 
contained  in  the  report?  NRP  NRP  no  NRC  yes  yes  yes  yes  E  E  E  E 
Is  the  application of  this process 
prescribed by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  no  NRC  no  no  no  no  E  no  E  E 
Is this process  applied  in practice 
in  a  manner  differing from  the 
principles  laid  down?  NRP  NRP  no  yes  no  no  no  no  E  no  E  E 
Is  the  application of  this modified 
process  prescribed by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  no  yes  no  no  no  no  E  no  E  E 
IV  - Second  report  on  specifications  and 
test conditions relating to fire-
resistant fluids  used  for  power 
transmission  (doc.  700/2/63) 
Part II - Specifications and  test 
conditions  (pp.  12  onwards) 
Article  1  - Conditions  of  authorisa-
tion  --
1.  Fire-resistant fluids  for  hydrau-
lie power  transmission  and  hydrau-
lie control,  before  being used  in 
mine  workings,  must  be  giv.en  a  C'3)  C' 3) 
certificate of  approval.  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  +E4)  E  4)  E  E  E  E 
This certificate must  indicate 
that the  product  has  been  subjec-
ted  to  the  following  tests: 
a)  Laboratory tests  (articles 3- 7) 
a a)  to  determine criteria of 
flammability  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'E  C'E  E  E  E  E 
(article 3,  p.l5) 
1)  tests with wet-flushed fly-ash  dams  are  to  be  m&de,  instead of plaster stoppings,  which will 
be  tested subsequently. 
2)  the  choice  of  means  is,  however,  left to  the  mine-manager. 
3)  in  the Charbonnages  de  France  register,  the  Mines  Safety Commission  Recommendations  have  been 
taken  into account. 
4)  the  question of  drawing  up  a  new  regulation is being examined  by  the  competent  authority. II,  32 
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bb)  to determine  bealth cri-
teria  (article 4,  p.  16)  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'E  C'E  E  E  E  E 
cc)  to determine  technical 
criteria (article 5,  p.  16}  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'E  C'E  E  E  E  E 
b)  Long-term tests during  normal 
operations  (article 8,  p.  24)  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
2.  These  tests are carried out under  1) 
an  authorised body.  C+C'  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
3.  Authorisation for  use  underground 
should be  dependent  on  presenta-
tion of  the certificate mentioned 
in 1.  above.  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'E  C'E  E  E  E  E 
Article  9  - Withdrawal  of  approval 
At  the request of  the  authorised  bod~ 
the  permitting authority may  withdraw 
the  approval  for  the  fluid  to be 
used  in mine  workings.  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  NRP  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
v  - Report  on  the  electro-magnetic 
examination of  winding  rope  {doc. 
nr.  847076472~. 
Steps  taken  to develop electro-
magnetic  testing methods  and  results  C'2)  C'2) 
obtained.  C'2  c  2)  - 3)  - 3)  ~'2) C'2)  +4)  +4)  ?  ?  C'  C' 
VI  - Report  on  the use  of  accelerometers 
to test winding  installations doc. 
37257176lz  p.  9  {German  text~. 
Tests with accelerometers  should  be 
continued  on  a  large scale.  C'  C'  -2)  -2)  - - - - ?  E  C'  C' 
Use  of  accelerometers  should be 
extended.  C'  C'  -2)  -2)  - - - - ?  E  C'  C' 
VII  - Recommendation  regarding  the  con-
sulting of  foreign experts  in  the 
case  of  rescue  operations connected 
with major  mining  accidents  {doc. 
436476173~. 
1)  in respect of  long-term tests. 
2)  trials to  improve  electro-magnetic testing methods  are underway. 
3)  measurements  are  taken  in  individual cases. 
4)  electro-magnetic testing of  cables  is required  in certain exceptional cases  in the General 
Mines  regulations. II,  33 
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In certain serious mining  accidents 
advice  requested  by  the  leaders of 
the  rescue  operation  from  qualified 
foreign  experts  in mine-rescue 
matters. 
The  heads  of  Mine  Rescue  Stations are 
provided  for  this purpose  with  a 
plan  containing the  most  important 
addresses  and  information  needed.  c'  1)  C'l; c' l) c'  1) c'  1)  ~' 1)  c'  1)  c'  1)  A  3  C'  C'l)  C I l) 
This  plan  should  be  constantly kept 
up-to-date.  c'  1)  c '1) c '1) C'l) c'  1) c' l) C I 1)  C'  A 2)  C'  ~'  1)  c' l) 
VIII -Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical 
equipment  for  nominal  voltages  above 
0  <I)  .....  0  c  c 
~.~~ 
....  </) 
..C</3~  co·- 0·-
B='-5  0·- ..... 
~i  1,100 volts  (doc.  2400/64/U  ·~~ §  ~·~ g  :9.~] 
~t-o  ~tOll  :::1'6. 
~ ~~ 
-o-o  ~>. 
1.  What  use  has  been  made  of  the  in- ~ g..E  c  ~ ...  :.atij  - ...  ..:1'-..c 
formation  contained  in  this report, 
...!.0>.  Sen..:~  .  ~·-=  :a-6  ·-c ...  la- (,)  ·:;  ()~  0  •  <I) 
C..·~-5 
~"0  and,  in particular,  to  whom  was  it  ........  ;:. 
.5  ~I  ...  c 
distributed?  ~a.~  -8 .E 5  ~~c.. 
</)..:! 
'9 o.-s  .g  ~  = 
<I)(,)</)  <I) 
~ ~ ...  -=~~ 
<I)~~  "0 
o<l)c£  ~·EZ~ 
..:!  ..:!  "0  ~  2.  The  Working Party  has  noted  that,  >.  ~  .~ -d  ~]"fi  :3Cil  :f  ~  ~  I '2  Cllc  'iS. 
in  the  Community  countries,  §·~~  ~ 
-o-:::1  ..:I.e  :I  e·- ..g  <I)  </) 
~  research  into  the  development  of  vi <I)  § .~  '5~0  a.-=~ :a  (;J£  "'  ....  :e  ..... z  <~oil)  ...  ..:!  0  0  <I):;._ i:  <1)·- low-oil or oil-less H.T.  switch- ~S,'iii  <I)  ~~..;  !  "'·=JP  c  0  :>  <I)  c  <1):.0  0  <I)~ 
~ 
.So!  gear  having  the  correct character- <!)§Oil  :.0  E  ~  ·-.~c.~  0</l  0  5. -s ..g  ·~  c.9- E  -o:>O~  <I) 
is  tics for  use  in  gassy pits is  ~-8~~ 
<I)  -
c 
"0  ~  .5 .c 
II)  :I  C.  .Sod'  being  continued. 
<I)  C"'- ...  <I) 
~ §-,S ~  ~~  ~  :E~~f-:  '0~ 
<I)  -5  :> 
:I ..:s.u::z:  0  .9  ... "0 ....  (,)  ..C~Qil  c.~~<!)  §~  </) 
What  is the  present position re- B~~5  c·;:.5  <I)  .E  0  .....  c  ~]  </):;  :fa-8  s 
Qll  garding this research  and  what  .5  ~-g:;  ·~~·e  ~f- t-5  :>  c  :I 
<I)  :I  0  e  data  have  been  obtained  to date?  ::; .5  E  ~  E <I),_  t::-d]'O  ~>.  :>  co 
~]~]  ~  s..e  ~  8.~::1(;J  I ·'5 -d  ";j  I 
~f'~]]  .5"'"  ~~ 
<I)  :I <I):>  c 
3.  The  Working  Party has  noted  that 
.. .c  </)  0  c..·E a  ·e  c..  <l)~c  ]·~:a 
oil is being used  in respect of  .5  ~ ~ 0  ..C.C<I)il)  ~i:l..c  0  ~ 
CZl  ':/J..C  c  f-·;;;u-s  f- :.0 ..g  ~  Zu.5  z  z 
relays,  and  that research would 
be  needed  to  reduce  or eliminate 
the  use  of oil.  What  research  is 
being carried out  to  this end?  3)  3)  4)  4)  ?  ?  5)  5)  5)  5)  4)  4) 
4.  This  Report  notes  that switchgear 
specialists are  trying to use  less 
- or  even  no - oil with voltages 
above  1,100 volts  and  that,  in 
particular,  oil-less switchgear 
with  separate poles,  and  low-oil 
switchgear,  were  being more  and 
more  widely  used  in most  countries, 
at  least for  new  plant. 
1)  the  main  First-Aid  Stations are  in touch with  the  main  Rescue Stations  in  the  Community 
countries. 
2)  not  applicable  in  the  Sulcis coal-field. 
3)  trials with oil-less relays  are  underway. 
4)  no  research  of  this kind  is being carried out. 
5)  see  above. II,  34 
Nether-
N.R./Wpb.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  lands 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1. 1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 1.1. 1.1. 1.1. 
1966 1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968  1966  1968 
These  observations  were  deduced  from 
practice  during  1960  - 1962. 
What  have  been  the  trends  since 
then?  1)  1)  2)  2)  3)  3)  4)  4)  4)  4)  2)  2) 
1)  this trend continues. 
2)  not  applicable. 
3)  within certain limits,  these  devices  may  also be  used  elsewhere after the  promulgation of  the 
new· regulations. 
4)  cf.  p.  II,  37. II,  35 
II  - HUMAN  FACTORS 
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Recommendation  on  the  fixing of  climatic 
limits  (the unabridget text is reproduced 
in doc.  3034/4/62~ 
1.1  The  basis is the American  effective 
temperature  (0  eff basic scale).  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
Air velocities  above  3  metres/sec 
should be  considered as only 3  metre~ 
sec  in determining  the American 
effective  temperature.  c  1)  c 1)  c  c  C'  C'  - - E  NRP  c  c 
1.2  The  temperature  data must  be  given 
so  as  to make  possible  a  comparison 
on  the basis  indicated under  1.1.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  - - E  NRP  c  c 
1.3  The  climatic limits determined shall 
be  maximum  values.  c  c  c  c  - - - - E  NRP  c  c 
More  favourable  climatic values for 
the  workers shall remain  unchanged.  c  c  c  c  - - - - E  NRP  -3)  - 3) 
1.4  There will be  further  investigation 
into the effectiveness and  accuracy 
of  the various climatic  indices.  ?  ?  - - - - - - E  NRP  - 3)  - 3) 
2.  Determination of  a  maximum  climatic 
value 
2.2  Work  on  location is forbidden  in 
working  places where  the  temperature 
exceeds  32°  eff A  (basic scale), 
excepting  the  cases named  in 2.3  and 
2.4.  c  c  c  c  - - 2)  2)  E  NRP  c  c 
2.3  An  exception can be  made  to the ban 
on  working  on  location in tempera-
tures  above  32°  eff A  (basic scale) 
if the  competent  authority has  given 
permission  and  the workers  in ques-
tion have  been  medically examined. 
In this case  the  following  conditions 
must  also be  fulfilled:  c 4)  c 4)  c  c  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
2.3.1 The  responsible  authority can  only 
issue  permission for  a  fixed  period 
and  for  given working operations.  c  c  c  c  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
2.3.2 The  work  must  be  carried out under 
medical  supervision.  c  c  C5) c  5)  - - - - E  NRP  c  c 
Guidelines  must  be  worked  out,  in 
collaboration with medical experts, 
covering  the medical  examination 
envisaged under 2.3.  c  c  - - - - - - E  NRP  c  c 
1)  3,5 metres/sec. 
2)  working points where  the  temperature  reaches 2s•c  are  considered  as  particularly hot  (without 
this being an  absolute  maximum  value). 
3)  not  applicable. 
4)  for  mine  rescue  personnel. 
5)  medical  supervision obligatory. II,  36 
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2.3.3  Work  must  not  continue uninterrupted 
for  more  than  one  hour.  A  suitable 
break  must  then  be  arranged  in  a 
better "climate".  c  c  c  c  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
The  duration  of  uninterrupted  working 
time,  as  well  as  the  duration  and 
frequency  of  the  breaks  and  the eli-
matic  range  in which  this break  is 
spent,  as  also all other necessary 
provisions  are  to be  laid  down  in 
writing by  the  competent  authority 
together with  the  responsible doctor 
before  the  work  begins.  c  1)  c  1  c  c  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
2.3.4 Acclimatised  persons  must  be  chosen. 
Persons  over  40  years  of  age  should 
not  be  put  to  this work.  c  c  - - - - - - E  NRP  c  c 
Persons under  21  and  over  45  years  of 
age  must  not  be  put  to this work.  c  c  c  2)  c  2)  - - - - E  NRP  c  c 
2.4  An  exception can  also be  made  to  the 
ban  on  working  on  location  in  tempe-
ratures  above  32°  eff A  (basic  scale) 
if danger  threatens or  in special 
circumstances calling for  immediate 
action.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c 3) c  3)  E  NRP  c  c 
In  such  case,  however: 
2.4.1 The  competent  authority  and  the 
responsible doctor  must  be  immediate-
ly  informed.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
2.4.2 This  work  must  be  performed  as  soon 
as  possible under  the  conditions 
listed  in 2.3.1 to 2.3.4.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  E  NRP  c  c 
3.  Climatic  range  between  32°  eff A  and 
28"  eff A  (basic  scale~  4)  4) 
3.1.1 Only  persons  shown  by  medical  exami-
nation  to be  suitable can  be  em-
ployed  in this climatic range.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c  E  NRP  C'  C' 
The  medical  examination must  pay 
particular attention to the  heart 
and  to blood circulation.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c  E  NRP  C'  C' 
Persons continually employed  in this 
climatic range  must  be  examined  me-
dically at  least once  a  year.  A  A  - - - - c  c  E  NRP  C'  C' 
In  addition,  the  following  provi-
sions  apply: 
1)  laid  down  generally  in  the  mine  rescue  plans. 
2)  no  provision made  for  excluding persons  below 21  years  of  age  from  exceptional  hot  work. 
3)  ..•  ban  on  work  on  location  in  excessively high  temperatures  ••• 
4)  range  of  climatic conditions  above  28°C. I I,  37 
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3.1.2  As  soon  as  a  working-point  reaches 
a  temperature  above  28°  eff A 
(basic  scale)  the  competent  autho-
rity must  be  informed  in writing.  A  A  c  l)  c 1)  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
3 .1.3 The  lenght of stay  in  the climatic 
range  between  30°  and  32°  eff A 
(basic scale)  is restricted to  5  A  A  c  2)  C2)  - - A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
hours,  and  in  the  range  between 
28°  and  30°  eff A  (basic scale)  to 
6  hours.  A  A  c  c  C'  C'  A  A  E  NRP  c  c 
3.1.4 For  work  in  a  climatic  range  between 
28°  and  32°  eff A  (basic scale)  a 
method  of  payment  corresponding  to 
these  conditions  must  be  applied 
to eliminate  any  overloading.  A  A  A  3)  A 3)  - - C'  C'  E  NRP  C'  C' 
3.1.5 The  provisions  quoted  in 3.1.3  and 
3.1.4  apply  to all persons  who, 
during  one  shift,  h&ve  to  work  more 
than  half  the  time  of  that shift in 
one  of  the  climatic  ranges  mentioned 
above.  A  A  c  c  - - A  A  E  NRP  C'  C' 
1)  if 30•  eff A  (basic scale)  is reached or exceeded,  the  Mines  Inspectorate must  be  informed. 
2)  six hours. 
3)  must  be  arranged  by tariff,  outside  the  intervention of  the  Mines  Inspectorate. II,  38 
C  - Regular  report  on  the  implementation of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published  in  the  Fourth Report 
HUMAN  FACTORS 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
I.  Recommendations  on  the  psyr,hological 
and  sociological factors  affecting 
safety  (3rd  report of  the  Mines  Safe-
ty Commission,  p,  425). 
l.  Measures  which  will  make  it possible 
for  workmen  to  recognise  dangers  and 
to carry out  their work  in  such  a 
way  that  these  dangers  are  avoided 
l,l  Recognising  dangers 
1.1.1 Before  starting work  in  a  district, 
a  section of  a  working  or  a  working-
point  and  before  any  planned  major 
change  in  the  manpower  deployment 
or  in  working  conditions,  it is  im-
portant  to  check  all the  safety 
precautions  to  meet  any  dangers  to 
be  encountered, 
1.1.2  During  the  work,  regular reports  on 
the  following  points must  be  prepared 
on  the basis of  the  safety conditions 
which  have  to  be  observed  under  con-
tinuous  supervision: 
a)  changes  in operating conditions 
b)  accidents or  incidents 
c)  dangerous  situations encountered 
during  work 
The  data  brought  together  in  these 
reports  should  be  systematically 
assessed  with  a  view  to  improving 
or  adapting  the  safety precautions 
in  force. 
1,1,3 After  the  work  has  been  finished, 
the  data  assembled  on  the basis  of 
daily experience  should  be  used  to 
prepare  a  report of  experience 
N.R./Wph. 
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1968 
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which  should  at  least  include  infor- C ,3) 
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used, 
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l)  laid  down  by  the  responsible  authority for  particular cases,  otherwise generally  included  in 
the enterprise's manual. 
2)  laid  down  for  accidents. 
3)  where  new  processes or materials are  introduced. 
4)  no  report  is drawn  up,  verbal or written  instructions given  to the  personnel  concerned, 
5)  such situations are  discussed at management  or  supervisor  level,  no  report  is drawn  up, 
6)  no  report  is  drawn  up  although  account  is taken  of  experience  gained, 
7)  as  regards  the  pattern of  work  and  not  actual operations  as  mentioned  in the  text. 
8)  not  only  when  work  is finished  but  in  any  case either weekly,  monthly  or  annually. Recommendations  by the Commission 
the  dangers  which  have  arisen  and 
the  precautions  taken  to deal  with 
them, 
together  with  any  accidents,  inci-
II,  39 
N.R./Wph. 
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1968 
dents  and  dangerous  situations which  l) 
have  occured  during  the  working  oper- C' 
ationso 
1.2  Making  known  the  dangers  to all 
concerned 
1.2.1 Before  starting work  in  a  district, 
a  section of  a  working  or  a  working-
point  or  in  the  event  of  a  major 
change  in  the  operating conditions, 
it is advisable  to  arrange  a  discus-
sion between  representatives of  the 
management,  supervisory staff  and 
members  of  the  safety services as 
well  as  the  workers  concerned or 
their representatives,  in order: 
- to  inform  each  individual with 
regard  to  the  work  envisaged 
- to  study  in detail the  work  to 
be  carried out 
- to settle upon  the  method  of  work 
1.2.2  The  workers  concerned  should  be 
informed  by  the  most  appropriate 
means  of  the  method  of  work  chosen. 
1.2.3 During  the  execution  of  the  work, 
the  management  and  the  supervisory 
staff should  refer  to  the  regula-
tions  and  instructions to  be  ob-
served  as  often  as  necessary  to 
counteract  the  effects of habit. 
1.2.4  If it is considered necessary  to 
issue  new  safety  instructions,  these 
should  be  brought  regularly to  the 
notice of  every  worker  concerned. 
1.2.5 Reports  made  by  each  of  the  workmen 
regarding  dangerous  situations which 
arise during  the  work  should  be 
brought  to  the  notice of  the  manage-
ment  staff. 
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2)  no  report  is drawn  up,  although  account  is taken  of  experience  gained. 
Italy 
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3)  this  takes  place  at engineer or supervisor  level,  or  even  af  Safety Committee  level,  but  not 
at  meetings  where  all the  people  mentioned  are  present. 
4)  workers'  safety representatives  may  give  their opinion  and  submit  their observations  in the 
form  provided  for  in  the  labour  legislation. 
5)  by  means  of  service  instructions  issued  by  the  management  of  the  mine,  or of  service notes 
issues  by  departmental  heads  and  supervisers. Recommendations  by the Commission 
1,3  Instruction  in  the  manner  in  which 
the  work  is to  be  carried out 
without  danger 
1,3.1 Every  worker  assigned  to underground 
work  must  be  able  to  show  that  he 
has: 
- a  general  training as  an  under-
ground  worker.: 
- a  special training for  the  work 
to which  he  is to be  assigned; 
- the  necessary  additional  training 
to cover  the  special working 
conditions  at  the  point  where 
he  will work. 
1.3.2  Should  there  be  a  change  in the 
work  or  in  the  working conditions, 
the  necessary  additional training 
must  be  provided, 
1,3,3  Instruction  in safety precautions  is 
to  be  considered  as  an  integral part 
of  vocational  training. 
1.4  Supervision to check  that safety 
regulations  are  observed  during  work 
1.4,1 During  the  work,  the  safety condi-
tions must  be  subject to continual 
supervision, 
1.4,2  The  duty to  see  that safety regula-
tions  are  observed,  and  the  respon-
sibilities resulting from  this 
duty,  fall upon  the  management  and 
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c 
Cl) 
c 
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supervisory staff,  C 
1.4.3 The  supervision,  which  must  be  exer-
cised with  authority,  should  in  its 
every-day  action seek  to  improve 
the  training  and  education  of  the 
workmen  on  the basis of  daily expe-
rience,  and  should  give rise to 
fines  or  penalties only  in very  se-
rious or  repeated  cases of  in-
fringement,  C +C' 
2.  Training  the  management  and  super-
visory staff in the matter of 
safety 
Saar 
1.1. 
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1)  laid  down  for  particular cases,  e,g,  ventilation specialists,  locomotive  drivers  and  winch 
operators. 
2)  laid  down  by  the  responsible  authorities for  particular cases,  otherwise generally  included 
in  the enterprises manual. 
3)  convention of  the Joint National Mines  Commission, 
4)  systematic training courses were  provided up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are  only provided where  new  machinery  and  equipment 
is  introduced, 
5) concerns  the  last part of  the  sentence: 
11 
•••  and  should  give rise  ••• 
11
• Recommendations  by the Commission 
2.1  General 
2.1.1  Steps  must  be  taken  to ensure  that 
the  supervisory staff does  not 
change  posts  frequently. 
2.1.2  The  vocational  training should  be 
adapted  to  the particular features 
of  the staff member's  task  and  his 
responsibiliDies,  and  in particular 
to  the  requirements of  his place  in 
the  hierarchy of  management  or  su-
pervisory staff. 
2.1.3  The  transition from  one  grade  to 
another  should  be  possible for  a 
given  person only after he  has 
actually proved  to  have  the re-
quired  knowledge  and  skill. 
2.2  Guidelines  for  the  vocational 
training of  the  management  or 
supervisory staff 
2.2.1 The  management  and  supervisory staff 
must  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of: 
- the  safety regulations; 
- the  safety precautions  to be 
taken; 
- the  available  safety equipement 
and  its use; 
- the  instructions  in force  for  the 
different vocational  groups  whose 
work  they  are  called upon  to  su-
pervise,  and  the  instructions for 
the exercise of  activities at the 
working  points  for  which  they  are 
responsible. 
2.2.2  The  fuanagement  and  supervisory staff 
must  be  able: 
- to point out  in  a  suitable way  to 
the workers  under  their orders 
the  dangers  associated with their 
work; 
- to  instruct these workers  as  to 
how  best  to carry out  the  work 
in order  to  avoid  these  dangers. 
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1)  where  certain supervisers are not  recognised  by  the responsible  authorities,  the responsibility 
for  carrying out  this recommendation  is left to  the  managing  director of  the  mine. 
2)  cannot be  laid down  in  the  form  of  a  regulation. 
3)  for  the  shotfirer. 
4)  by  limited competition  in the  E.N.E.L.  (Ente  Nazionale  per 1' Energia Elettrica). II,  42 
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Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1968  1968  1968  1968  1968  1968 
2.2.3  The  management  and  supervisory 
staff should  be  trained  in  how  to  1)  2) 
issue  instructions.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.4  Special  attention must  be  paid  to 
the  continual  further  training of 
all management  and  supervisory 
staff.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.5  The  management  and  supervisory 
staff must  both: 
- account  for  and  report  on  the 
execution of  their work,  and  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- account  for  and  report  on  all 
accidents  and  other notable 
incidents which  have  occurred 
during  the  working  period at the 
points  for  which  they  are  respon-
sible,  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C' 
2.2.6  The  management  and  supervisory 
staff must  be  able: 
- to  draw  up  accident  reports  c ,3)  correctly;  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to  assess  and  use  the  data  in 
C'3)  these  reports:  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to  study  and  establish the 
C'3)  causes  of  accidents;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to  work  out  means  to  avoid  c ,3)  accidents;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to receive  the  training necessary  c ,3)  to  this end.  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.3  Staff  responsible  for  training 
2.3.1 The  staff responsible  for  the 
training activities set out  in 
paragraphs  1.3  and  2  must  be  numer-
ous  enough  and  must  have  available 
the  necessary  means  and  time  to 
carry out  their task properly.  c  c  C'  C'  4)  C' 
2.4  Drawing  up  of  an  accident  report; 
training of staff responsible  for 
filling  in such reports 
1)  for  the  management  staff.  No  systematic  training in management  for  other grades. 
2)  this is not  considered  as  a  subject  for  training.  Preference  is given  to constant  super-
vision of  the staff. 
3)  for  the  management  staff.  For  supervision staff  in certain cases only. 
4)  systematic training courses  were  given up  to  1963,  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeshop  and  training are  only provided where  new  machinery  and  equip-
ment  is  introduced, Recommendations  by the Commission 
2.4,1 The  accident  report must,  taking 
into  account  all the  appropriate 
human  and  technical  factors,  give 
all necessary  information  and  in 
particular: 
- the  circumstances,  the  conse-
quences  of  the  accident,  the 
causes, 
- the  precautions  proposed  to 
avoid  similar accidents 
2.4.2  Each  of  these  items of  information 
referred  to  in  point 2.4.1  must  be 
capable  of  formulation  as  an  answer 
to  a  clear  and  precise  question. 
2.4.3  The  breakdown  and  layout  of  the 
form  used  for  accident reports 
must  clearly show  which  questions 
have  to be  answered  by  each  of  the 
members  of  the  staff contributing 
to  the  preparation of  the  reports. 
2.4.4 There  must  be  sufficient  room  on 
the  form  for  supplementary  remarks 
or  sketches  which  may  be  provided 
by  the  person  or persons  concerned. 
2.4.5  Each  of  the  persons contributing 
to  the  preparation of  the  report 
must  be  informed  with regard  to: 
- the  importance  of  each  question, 
- the  way  to provide  correct  answers 
to  the  questions. 
2.4.6 Practical  instruction should  be 
provided  to  draw  the  attention of 
the  employees  concerned  to  the 
consequences  of  omissions,  neglect-
ful  or unclear  answers  to  the 
questions. 
2.4.7 Systematic  attention should  be  paid 
to  ensure  that  the  answers  are 
complete,  accurate  and  precise. 
2.4.8  The  accidents reports referred  to 
in this chapter  are  to be  drawn  up 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  accident 
prevention. 
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1)  the  form  used  by  the  professional mining organisation does  not  comply  entirely with this 
provision. 
2)  does  not  exist. 
3)  systematic  training courses  were  given  up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are  only  provided  when  new  machinery  and  equipment 
are  introduced, Recommendations  by the Commission 
2.5  Appointment  and  promotion of 
management  or  supervisory staff 
2.5,1 Care  should  be  taken  to ensure  that 
there  is available  an  adequate  num-
ber of  management  or  supervisory 
staff possessed of  the requisite 
skills both  in  the  technical  and 
II,  44 
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safety fields.  C+C' 
2.5.2  The  selection of  this staff is the 
responsibility of  the  employer, 
who  must  at  least  inform  the  compe-
tent authority of  the  persons 
entrusted with  supervision of  working 
operations,  together with  the  neces-
sary data justifying the  selection,  C 
2,5.3  To  ensure  a  selection which  promises 
success,  there  should  be  laid down 
the  minimum  requirements  for  appoint-
ment  to  a  post  in  one  of  these  cate-
gories,  either by  direct  appointment 
or by  promotion,  together with  the 
certificates and  other  documents 
which  are  the  necessary requisite 
for  such  an  appointment.  C' 
2.5.4  The  competent  authority should  be  in 
a  position to  check  the  knowledge 
and  skills of  the  management  or 
supervisory staff - both  from  the 
human  and  technical points  of  view  -
should this authority consider it 
necessary,  at  least  in  the  case  of 
a  major  failure  or  of  repeated 
failures  in  the  performance  of  duties  C 
3,  Usefulness  of  psycho-technical 
examinations 
3.1  On  assignment 
3.1.1 It is recommended  that  the  applica-
tion of  a  relatively simple  psycho-
technical examination  upon  assignment 
should  be  developed  as  far  as  pos-
sible,  in order  to: 
- determine  the  general  intellectual 
level  of  the  candidate; 
- to  exclude  those  candidates whose 
intellectual  level  lies below  a 
pre-determined  minimum. 
1)  does  not exist  in practice. 
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2)  the  managing  director of  the  mine  informs  his chief engineer  of  the  name  of  the  departmental 
head  in  charge  of  technical matters. 
3)  as  regards  the  reasons  for  the  choice. 
4)  the  law  lays  down  a  provision concerning  the  academic  qualifications of  directors  and  depart-
mental  heads. 
5)  ~sycho-technical examinations  are  required for  certain duties only  (winding-enginemen,  loco-
motive  drivers).  Other enterprises have  these  types  of  examination for  other duties. 
6)  for  the shotfirers. 
7)  this ceased  when  recruitment  was  discontinued. 
8)  cf.  3)  on  previous  page. Recommendations  by the Commission 
3.2  Before  the  exercise of  specific 
duties 
3.2.1  In every  instance,  the  workmen  who 
are  to be  made  responsible  for  the 
execution  of particular working 
operations, 
- with which  there  is associated  a 
particular responsibility  in 
respect of  collective safety 
or 
- which call for particular 
intellectual or personality 
characteristics 
should  be  subjected to  a  special 
psycho-technical examination  to 
determine  whether  they  have  the 
capacities required for  this activ-
ity, 
3,2,2 The  competent  authority must,  in 
co-operation with  the  representatives 
of  the  employers  and  employees,  keep 
up  to date  the  list of  work  for 
which  those special examinations  are 
to be  prescribed  and,  to this end, 
should list the duties which  have 
been  shown  by  experience  to call 
for  such tests and  for  which  such 
tests can  in practice be  carried 
out. 
3,3  Before  any  promotion  of  a  worker 
to  a  supervisory post 
3.3.1 Before  the  promotion  of  any  workman 
to  a  supervisory post,  a  suitable 
psycho-technical examination  must 
be  carried out. 
3.4  Principles underlying the various 
psycho-technical examination 
3,4,1 The  psycho-technical examinations 
listed under 3,2  and  3,3  should, 
as  far  as possible,  aid  the  voca-
tional specialisation of  the 
worker  in  question. 
1)  cf.  5)  on  previous  page. 
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3)  ceased  when  recruitment  was  discontinued, 
4)  does  not exist. 
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5)  eligibility for  promotion within  the supervisor grade  is determined  during  the vocational 
training  laid-down  by  the  responsible authorities. 
6)  when  there was  in fact  a  psychological  department. 
7)  systematic  training courses were  given  up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are only provided  when  new  machinery  and  equip-
ment  are  introduced. II,  46 
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3.4.2  The  management  must  lay  down  the 
criteria which  have  to  be  met  by 
the  candidate  on  assignment,  or  (1) 
later,  when  directed  to special  A  E  C'  C'  C'  C' 
tasks, 
and  must  seek  the  advice  of  1) 
psychologists  when  so  doing.  A  E  C'  C'  C'  C' 
3.4.3  The  psychologist's  assessment will 
be  valid only  for  a  restricted 
period  and  must  be  compared  with 
the  assessments  of  the  vocational  1)  2) 
behaviour  of  the  person  in  question.  A  E  C'  C'  E  C' 
(1)  psycho-technical examinations  are  required for  certain duties only  (winding-enginemen, 
locomotive  drivers).  Other enterprises have  these  types  of  examination for  other duties. 
(2)  when  there  was  in fact  a  psychological  department. II,  47 
GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION  BY  ITALY 
It should  be  noted that,  puFsuant  to Article 23  of  the  Mining Regula-
tions  in force,  the  subject referred  to  above  has  been  included  in  the collective 
agreements. 
The  Italian coalmines,  which  as  is well  k~own,  are  only worked  in  the 
Sulcis  (Sardinia)  coalfield,  have  been  for  some  time  placed under  the  control of 
the  "Ente  Nazionale  per  l'Energia Elettrica  (E.N.E.L.)",  since their total pro-
duction  are  intended  for  the Porto Vesme  (Cagliari)  thermal  plants.  The  staff  in 
these  mines  benefit from  the  guarantees  given  by  the  collective agreement  applica-
ble  to workers  in  the electricity sector,  which  is among  the  most  favourable 
collective  agreements  at present  in force  in Italy.  In particular,  this agreement 
excludes  piecework  and,  consequently  a  negative  answer  should  be  given  to  the 
questionnaire  as  regards  the  application of  the  recommendation  concerned or,  in 
any  case,  the  latter should be  considered as not  complying with the  de  facto 
situation. 
For  the  sake  of  covering all contingencies,  however,  it was  considered 
advisable  to  include  the  rather  improbable  possibility of  new  coalmines  being 
opened,  which  are  not directly  linked with  the  production of electrical energy, 
and  to  answer  the  questionnaire  on  the basis of  the collective agreement  of  13  May 
1967  which  is applicable  in  the  mining  industry. 
It should  also be  noted  that,  from  page  54  onwards  of  the  questionnaire 
concerned,  the  symbol  "C"  and  other  symbols  used  in  the  answer  refer to clauses of 
the  collective agreement mentioned  above  and  not  to standards codified  in  the 
form  in  legislation or regulations. II. 
l. 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
Recommendations  as  to  principles  to 
be  observed  in  view  of  the  possible 
influence  of  payment  at piece  rates 
~n safety  in coalmines  (4th report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  Annex  IV) 
Piecework  arrangements 
1.1  Minimum  age;  medical  examinations 
l,l.l To  be  assigned  to  piecework,  a 
miner  must 
- be  not  less than  18  years  of  age 
- have  undergone  a  medical  examina-
tion  to establish his fitness  for 
such work, 
1.1.2  Similar examinations  must  follow  at 
regular  intervals. 
1.2  Make-up  of  piece rates 
II,  49 
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1.2.1 Written particulars of  the  operations 
to  be  performed  must  be  given  to  the 
men  concerned,  including  such  infor-
mation  as  is needed  to calculate  the 
amount  payable  therefor,  C'6 ) 
1.2.2  In  the  interests of  safety,  the 
piecework  arrangement  employed  must 
either 
- provide  that operations of  impor-
tance  to  safety shall be  paid  on 
a  separate basis,  or  -
- contain equivalent  financial  safe-
guards  for  the  proper execution of 
such  operations.  C'6 ) 
1.2.3  In  the  event  of  its being  found 
necessary  to carry out  safety opera-
tions  not  expressly provided for, 
this must  not  be  allowed  to  affect 
the  pay  of  the  man  or  men  concerned.  C'6 ) 
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l)  Questions relating to  pay  cannot  be  dealt with by  the responsible  authorities.  Such  questions 
are  settled by  means  of  collective  agreements. 
2)  all workers  are  subjected  to medical  examinations  when  taken  on  and  to similar examinations  at 
regular  intervals. 
3)  periodic X-ray  examinations  (every  15  months  at most).  Periodic clinical examination only 
where  signs of  pneumoconiosis  are detected or  on  medical  advice. 
4)  pursuant  to Article  23  of  the  Mining Regulation  in  force,  this question  was  the  subject of 
collective agreements.  Consequently,  from  page  2  onwards  of  the  questionnaire,  the  symbols 
used  refer to clauses of  the  collective  agreement  of  13  May  1967. 
5)  pursuant  to  the  Mining Regulation  and  to  the  provisions relating to  young  workers. 
6)  settled by collective agreement. Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.3  Fixing of  norms  and  of rates payable 
therefor 
1.3.1 The  men  must  have  the right to 
discuss  the  fixing of  piecework 
norms  and  rates with  the  employer. 
1.3.2  If agreement  is not  reached,  the  men 
or  their representatives must  have 
the  right  to start conciliation pro-
ceedings under  4  below. 
1.4  Forms  of  piecework 
1.4.1 One-man  piecework  should  preferably 
be  permitted only where  the  opera-
tions concerned  are  not of  a  nature 
to  allow of  any  other  form  of  piece-
work. 
1.5  Determination of  the  norm 
1.5.1 The  norm  must  be  determined  in 
accordance  with  : 
the  amount  of  time  actually 
available during  a  normal  shift; 
the  amount  of  work  the  men  can 
fairly be  expected  to perform 
during  this time,  having  regard 
to  the  working conditions; 
the  amount  of  time  required to 
perform the  operations properly. 
1.6  Calculation of  the  end  wage 
1.6.1 The  basis  and  mode  of  calculation 
must  be  sufficiently simple  for  any 
worker  to be  able  to  work  out  for 
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himself  the  sum due  him  for  a  given  1) 
period. 
1.7  Performance  in piecework 
1.7.1 Regulations  should  be  laid down 
requiring that periodic  checks  be 
carried out  on  the  amounts  of  work 
performed  for  the  purpose  of deter-
mining  the  wages  payable  therefor, 
and  that  the  findings  be  duly 
notified to  the  men  concerned. 
1)  settled by  collective agreement. 
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2)  for  certain operations,  one-man  piecework  is considered by both sides to  the  agreement  as 
the  most  appropriate  type  of  remuneration. 
3)  the  collective  agreement  does  not  provide  for  conciliation procedures,  although such  procedure 
exists  and  the Ministry of  Labour  and  Social Security acts as  an  arbitrator  (whose  decisions 
are  not  binding). II,  51 
N.R./Wpb. 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1. 
1968 
1.7.2 Particulars must  be  supplied  to  the 
men  of  all additions  and  deductions 
affecting the  amount  of  the  end  wage, 
together with details  as  to  how  these  1) 
were  calculated.  C' 
2.  Changes  in conditions at  the  work-
place 
2.1  A  piecework  arrangement  may  be  ter-
minated  or  amended  if the  employer 
and  the  men  are  agreed  that  genuine 
difficulties warranting this course  1) 
have  been objectively found  to exist.  C' 
Failing such  agreement,  the  men  must 
have  the right  to  ask  nevertheless 
that  the  arrangement  be  terminated  1) 
or  amended  forthwith.  C' 
2.1.1 If  the  men  cannot  be  paid at piece 
rates for  so  long  as  the difficulties 
persist,  they must  be  paid  a  proper  1) 
wage  appropriate  to their grade.  C' 
3.  Managerial  and  supervisory staff 
3.1  In  the  interests of  safety,  extra 
supervision must  be  provided  in 
workings  where  men  are  employed  on 
piecework. 
3.1.1 Since failure  to carry out safety 
operations  in  good  time  can result 
in particular hazards,  the super-
visory  personnel  must  give  the  men 
strict and  relevant  instructions to 
this effect,  and  check  regularly to 
see  that these  are carried out. 
3.2  Payment  of  managerial  and  supervisory 
staff 
3,2.1  Since  managerial  and  supervisory 
staff are  responsible  not  only  for 
the  organisation and  smooth  running 
of operations,  but  also 
1)  settled by  collective agreement. 
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for  the safety of  the  men  engaged 
in  them,  they  should  as  a  rule be 
paid  out  on  a  basis  independent of  1) 
the  ups  and  downs  of  production.  A  C'  c  c  c  C' 
They  may  be  granted  production or 
output  bonuses  provided  they  have 
at the  same  time  a  sufficient finan-
cial incentive  to devote  the  1) 
necessary attention to safety.  A  C'  C'  c  c  C' 
4.  Settlement of disputes 
4.1  There  should  be  a  conciliation system 
for  dealing with  any  disputes 
arising between  management's  and 
men's  representatives with  regard 
to piecework  arrangements or their  2) 
implementation.  C'  C'  C'  c  3)  c 
4.1.1 The  conciliation system should  oper-
ate  by  means  of  a  board on  which 
employers  and  workers  are equally 
represented,  and  which  should 
approach disputes  in the  light of  2) 
the  present recommendations.  C'  C'  C'  c  3)  c 
4.1.2 The  fact  that proceedings  of this 
kind  are  pending must  not  affect 
the  terms  of  employment  of  the  men  2) 
concerned,  C'  C'  C'  c  C'  c 
who  must  continue to be  entitled 
to  a  fair wage  appropriate  to their  2) 
grade.  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c 
1)  cannot  be  the subject of Mines  Authority prescriptions.  Settled according to area. 
2)  settled by collective agreement. 
3)  systematic  training courses were  given up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged  and 
therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are only provided when  new  machinery  and  equipment  are 
introduced. III,  1 
LIST  OF  REPORTS  BY  THE 
WORKING  PARTY  ON  COMBUSTIBLE  DUSTS 
ANNEX  III 
1)  Memorandum  on  useful data for  the  study of  dust explosion  accidents  in  the 
Community  and  the United  Kingdom. 
2)  Survey of  typical accidents due  to coaldust explosions over  a  ten-year period 
in the  Community  and  the United  Kingdom,  and  comments  thereon. 
3)  A bibliographical study of  research work  on  the subject of  dust barriers  in 
the Community  and  the United  Kingdom. 
4)  A Community  experimental  programme  relating to dust barriers. 
5)  A joint system of reports on  experiments carried out  in  the  Community  and  the 
United  Kingdom  concerning  the testing of barriers for  the  prevention of  coal-
dust explosions. 
Copies  of  these reports  may  be  obtained from  the secretariat of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission. TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS 
WORKINGS  PARTIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  IV IV,  3 
I.  Working Party on Electrification - Chairman  M.  LOGELAIN 
A.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted safety  and  accident  prevention provisions relating to: 
(a)  electric shock1 
(b)  fire  hazard, 
(c)  explosion hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining the  present position in  Community  countries with  regard  to 
safety regulations  on  underground electrical networks  of  low  and  medium 
voltage  (up  to  1,100 V)  and  feeder  cables  for  movable  equipment,  with  due 
regard  to  the specifications for  the  said cables. 
3.  Reporting on  steps  to  be  taken  when  work  has  to  be  carried out  on  electrical 
equipment  under  voltage. 
4.  Studying  the  deleterious effects on  electrical equipment  used  underground 
of moisture  in salt pastes  and  salt pastes  used  in dust  suppression. 
5.  Studying  the  construction of  high-tension cables  (of  up  to 6,000  V)  used 
underground,  and  protective equipment. 
B.  Preliminary work  to  be  undertaken  by  the Secretariat 
1.  Comparison  of safety provisions relating to  underground electric locomotives, 
with  emphasis  on  the possibility of  reducing  the  frequency  of  trolley wire 
sparking. 
2.  Periodic reports  on  oil-powered  contactors used  in  gassy  environments. 
3.  Investigation of  the  use  of  remote-control circuits in automated mining 
operations. 
4.  Study of over-voltage  caused  by  lightning and  the  problem of stray currents. 
II.  Working Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires and  Underground  Combustion  - Chairman 
Mr.  HELLER 
General  terms  of  reference  (Section  7  of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission's 
Terms  of  Reference) 
Exchange  of  information  on  rescue  work  and  fire-fighting  in connection with 
accidents of  interest to  the  Working Party. 
A.  Underground  combustion 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Continuing  the  study of  the  problem of  fire-fighting in very  deep  pits, 
if necessary with  the  help  of  small-scale  model  tests and  full-scale 
experiments,  should  a  favourable  opportunity arise. 
2.  Continuing  the  study of  the  problem of  sealing off fire  and  ventilation 
stoppings,  as  well  as  roadway  walls,  by  means  of urethane  foam. 
Examining  this question  so  that  in  the  event,  suitable proposals  may  be 
submitted to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
3.  Continuing  the  study of specifications  and  test conditions applicable  to 
fire-resistant  fluids: IV,  4 
(a)  comparing test results so  as  to prevent  products  being differently 
assessed; 
(b)  where  necessary,  adapting test criteria to  technological progress; 
(c)  in addition,  examining  to what  extent it might  be  possible  to  relax 
these criteria and  test methods  so  that  the products  may  be  more 
easily assessed  and  approved. 
4.  Studying  the stabilisation of ventilation in the  event  of pit fires  in 
accordance  with Professor  BUDRYK's  theory,  and  any practical conclusions 
to  be  drawn  from  it with  reference  to  Community  mines. 
This  item to  be  extended  to  cover  general ventilation problems  in view of 
their special bearing on  fires. 
5.  Exchanging  views  on  the  reopening  in the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom 
of stoppings of fire zones,  and  where  necessary  to  adapt  regulations already 
drafted. 
6.  The  early detection of underground  combustion  and  rapid provision of 
air-tight stoppings. 
Studying technological  advances  in these  spheres  in both  the  Community 
and  the  United  Kingdom. 
7.  Drawing  up  a  synoptic comparison of the  rules and regulations relating to 
the prevention and  control of underground  combustion,  as  drafted by  the 
mining authorities of  the  Community  and of  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  practical application of experience  gained  in this field. 
B.  Rescue  Arrangements 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Communication of  the  annual  reports  issued  by  the rescue  stations and 
regular discussion of these  documents. 
2.  Convening meetings  on  special occasions  (accidents  from  which  new  infor-
mation  can  be  gained,  technical  innovations  in materials,  equipment,  etc.). 
3.  The  publication every  two  years of  a  report outlining in particular the 
situation as  regards  rescue  organisations  in the  Community  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 
4.  Improvements  in respirators used  by  rescue  workers. 
5.  Improvements  in self-rescuers. 
6.  Exchanges  of  view  on  the  use  of  smoke  powders  to simulate  smoke  in practice 
galleries. 
7.  Listing of materials  for  use  in special rescue  operations. 
8.  Examination of  the  technique  for  rescuing trapped miners  by  means  of  large 
boreholes with  a  view to  formulating rules based on  experience  gained  in 
different countries and  submitting practical regulations to  the  mining 
authorities. 
9.  Drawing  up  of  a  synoptic  comparison of the  rules and  regulations relating 
to rescue arrangements  and  medical  assistance,  as drafted by  the mining 
authorities of  the  Community  and  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  practical application of experience  gained  in this field. 
10.  Studying of  the  Community  criteria for  fireproof  clothing and  general 
requirements. IV,  5 
III.  Working Party on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft  Guides  - Chairman  Mr.  MARTENS 
Terms  of reference 
1.  Follow-up of progress  made  in the electro-magnetic testing of winding  ropes 
so  as  to obtain  information on their use  in Community  mines. 
2.  Testing of  couplings  for  circular strand and  flattened-strand winding ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the  installation of capels. 
4.  Control  of shaft guides  by  means  of  automatic error detectors. 
5.  Maintenance  required to ensure  safe operation of winding ropes  and  balance 
ropes. 
IV.  Working Party on  Mining Accident  Statistics.~ Chairman  Mr.  REBIERE 
Terms  of reference 
Examination of  the methods  used  in Community  countries for  establishing m1n1ng 
accident statistics. Particular examination of the criteria applied in defining 
the  term "mining accident"  and  the criteria used  in classifying the accidents 
according  to  cause,  duration of stoppage  and site of  lesions. 
With  the exact definition of  these criteria as  a  basis,  establishing differences 
between  the statistical elements  assembled  in each  country and  ways  of  taking 
these  differences  into account  in possible  comparisons  on  a  Community  level. 
v.  Working Party on  Combustible  Dusts  - Chai~man Mr.  SCHNEIDER 
Terms  of reference 
With  due  consideration of  the mechanism of  dust  combustion and  flame  propagation, 
carry out  a  study of precautions against dust  combustion,  particularly: 
(a)  dust barriers  (different types  of dust barriers,  their construction,  siting, 
etc.).  Where  necessary,  make  suggestions  for  research  work  is considered 
necessary  for  a  better understanding of  the  phenomena  studied and  the pro-
motion of safety in these  fields; 
(b)  dust neutralisation  (dust control  in situ,  stone-dusting,  spraying,  dust 
fixation by  spreading salts and  coagulating pastes,  etc.). 
VI.  Working Party on  Health  in Coal  Mines  - Chairman  Mr.  VANDENHEUVEL 
Studying,  from  the  standpoint of  technical prevention and  industrial medicine, 
the  prevention of environmental risks to  the  health of workers  in coal mines. 
A.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on  means  of dust  control,  and 
general measures  to reduce  dustiness  in underground workings,  recognised 
as  being  to some  extent effective  (wet  drilling,  water  infusion,  spraying, 
special attachments  to winning machines,  pulsed-infusion shotfiring,  etc.); 
2.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on  the organisation of specialised 
dust-control services. 
B.  Preliminary work  to  be  undertaken  by  the Secretariat 
The  assembling of  documentary material  and  comparison of  legislation in 
the various  Community  countries with  reference  to: IV,  6 
1.  General  rules  covering  the  prevention of dust  in respect of  the  design 
and  use  of winning machines;  standards  to  be  observed to ensure  minimum 
dustiness  arising  from  the  use  of  these machines. 
2.  Dust  measurement  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions  to 
be  drawn  etc.)  and  where  necessary establishing  a  scale of  comparison of 
the  various methods  employed. 
3.  Establishment  of dustiness  tresholds.  Definition of  categories of  permis-
sible dustiness.  Steps  to  be  taken when  faced  with  various categories of 
dustiness. 
VII.  Working  Party on  Effects of  Working  Time  on  Safety at  Work,  especially  in Diffi-
cult or  Unhealthy  Conditions  - Chairman  Mr.  VAN  DER  HOOFT 
Provisional  Terms  of reference  (definitive text  to  be  submitted to  the Restrict-
ed  Committee): 
Number  of  hours  worked  in wet  working points.  Determining  in what  cases  a  working 
point  is to  be  considered wet  and  the  precautions  to  be  taken. 
VIII.  Working  Party  on  Psychological  and  Sociological  Factors affecting Safety -
Chairman  Mr.  SCHNASE 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Safety  campaigns. 
2.  A  draft  recommendation  on  the  employment  of  foreign  and  young  workers. SIXTH  REPORT  OF  THE  WORKING  PARTY  ON  MINE  RESCUE  AS  REGARDS 
THE  ORGANISATION  OF  MINE  RESCUE  SERVICES  IN 
1965  and  1966 
ANNEX.V v'  3 
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INTRODUCTION 
I.  The  present Report  relates to  1965  and  1966. 
During this period the situation  in  the  coalmining  industry  led  to  a  further 
reduction  in  the  number  of  first-aid workers.  With  the  exception of  the  Saar, 
the Nord/Pas-de-Calais  and  Sulcis coalfields,  this observation applies  to  every 
coalfield covered  by  the present Report. 
The  total  number  of  first-aid workers  in the  Community  and  the United  Kingdom 
fell  from  12,820  in  1964  to  11,560 in  1966,  i.e.  10%;  for  underground workers, 
however,  the  percentage  rose  from  15.5% to  16.6%,  i.e.  7%. 
II.  The  Working Party on  Rescue  Arrangements  did  not  confine its attention to  the 
problems  outlined  in  the Fifth Report  but  during this period  found  it advisable 
to  hold  a  number  of  meetings  at the main  Rescue  Stations  (the previous meetings 
of this kind were  held over  7  years  ago). 
As  is known,  the  1958  and  1959 visits resulted  in the  drafting of  the First Re-
port  on  rescue  arrangements  in mines. 
The  object of  such  visits is to  permit  an  exchange  of  views  on  the use  of  new 
equipment  and materials,  to  gain  first-hand  information on  new  processes  and 
methods  used  in  the  most  widely  different sectors of  the  rescue organisation 
and  also  to establish personal contact with  experts  who  are  not  members  of  the 
Working Party. 
In  1966,  the  Working Party held meetings at the  Essen-Kray  and  Mansfield Rescue 
Stations.  At  Essen-Kray,  the  discussion dwelt  mainly  on  the  following  problems 
and practical matters: 
(a)  the organisation of rescue  work  in the  Ruhr  and  the  tasks of  the Central 
Rescue  Station,  with  emphasis  on  changes  introduced since  the  last visit in 
1958; 
(b)  the  technique  for  rescuing  trapped miners  by  means  of  large boreholes; 
(c)  a  demonstration of  devices  and  equipment  specially adapted  for  rescue  work, 
particularly the most  recent  models  (particularly  lightweight closed-circuit 
breathing apparates  using oxygen,  new  CO-recording devices,  etc.); 
(d)  a  visit to  the  laboratory and  a  demonstration of  equipment  for  testing CO-
filter self-rescuers; 
(e)  revival  training,  particularly by  means  of  the mouth-to-mouth  method,  pulsat-
ing motor  method  and  cardiac massage  method; 
(f)  organisation of  the medical  aid service; 
(g)  alerting the  medical  aid service  in co-operation with  the  army. 
The  Mansfield  talks were  mainly  on  the  following  subjects: 
(a)  plaster stoppings,  increasingly used  when  a  fire or  explosion hazard exists, 
as  being sturdy,  rapidly constructed and  safe; 
(b)  demonstration of  a  mobile  TV  studio  to  be  used  as  an  aid  in rescue  operations 
and  in the training of  rescue  men; 
(c)  demonstration of  a  mobile winning  device  for  use  in the  event of  a  break-
down  of  the  winning machines; 
(d)  inspection of  an up-to-date  mobile scientific laboratory  for  quick on-the-
spot analyses of  gases: 
(e)  demonstration of  a  vacuum/pressure  impregnation plant  for  the  fire-retardant 
treatment  of mining  timber~ 
(f)  demonstration of  new  types  of  rescue  equipment  and  self-rescuers. v,  6 
Further visits are  being made.  The  documentation distributed on  these occasions 
has  been  translated and,  together with  the  reports,  provides  information on  the 
present position of  the subjects dealt with. 
III.  The  following  is a  list of reports  on  the organisation of  rescue  work  published 
to date: 
1.  Report  on visits to  the  rescue  stations in the  Community  and  the  United  King-
dom  (published  in the  Mines  Safety and Health  Commission's  Second  Report, 
Annex  B). 
2.  Second Report  on  the organisation of  Mine  Rescue  Services  as at  1960  (published 
in the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission's  Third Report,  Annex  V a). 
3.  Third Report  on  the organisation of  Mine  Rescue  Services as at  1961  (published 
in  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission's Third Report,  Annex  VI  A). 
4.  Fourth  Report  on  the organisation of  Mine  Rescue  Services as at  1962  (published 
in the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission's  Third  Report,  Annex  VII  a). 
5.  Fifth Report  on  the organisation of  Mine  Rescue  Services  as at  1963-1964  (pub-
lished in  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission's  Third Report,  Annex  VIII  a). A,  ORGANISATION  OF  MINE  RESCUE  SERVICES 
Position as  at  t  31.12.1966 
1.  Rescue  Stations  and  Rescue  Workers 
Country  German  Federal Republic  France  Belgium  Italy  Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom  Total 
Coalfield  Ruhr  Aachen  Saar  Nord/Pas- Lorraine  Borinage  Charleroi  LHige  Cam pine  Sulci  a  Limburg  de•Ca1ais  Namur 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (.4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (a)  {9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Bongen- Friedrichs- Marci- Minier  a  a}  Central Rescue 
Essen-Kray  Mariadorr  tha1  Lens  Mer1ebach  Frameries  nella  G1ain  Basse1t  Seruoi 
(+)  (++)  Station 
(responsibilities)  1,2,4,5,6  1,2,4  1,2,3,4,6  1,2,4,6  1,2,3,4,6  1,2,3,4,5,1  1,2,3,4  1,2,3,4,6  1,2,4,6  1,2,4 
b)  Number  of rescue  A •  14 
204  6  52  9  1  1  1  7  1  11  stations  82  13 
B  •  12 
c)  lfumber  of rescue 
660  men  4  563  291  719  564  121  260  198  285  16  555  3  328  11  560 
d)  Total underground 
personnel  employed  163 426  15 865  22  407  67  620  20  422  6  714  12 458  7  562  27  958  873  21  367  326  970  693  642 
e)  Rescue  men  per  1000 
underground workers  27.9  18.3  32.0  9.8  27.6  18,0  20.9  26.2  10.2  18,0  26.0  10.1  16.6 
{+)  Netherlands  :  there is no  central rescue  station in  the  Limburg coalfiels, 
(++)  United  Kingdom  :  there  is no  national rescue  station.  In each coalfield,  a  separate  Committee  is responsible for  the  organisation of  the  rescue  services  and 
there  is also a  National Advisory  Committee  to  the  National  Coal  Board which  deals  with all aspects  of  rescue  work,  including scientific 
research. 
Each  rescue station usually serves  mines  within a  15-mile radius.  They  are  subdivided  into  "Plan  A"  Stations  and  "Plan  B"  Stations. 
*)  Responsibilities 
Reference  number  1  •  Organisation of  rescue  services 
2  •  Supervision of rescue men  and  rescue  stations 
3  •  Permanent  rescue  brigade 
4  •  Training 
5  •  Co-ordination of safety equipment 
6  •  Research  on  rescue  work 
"Plan  A"  Stations 
"Plan  B"  Stations 
those  having their own  permanent  rescue  brigade 
whose  members  live  on  the  station or nearby,  they 
are  assisted  by  a  number  of part-time  rescue  men  in 
mines  served by  the  station. 
those  not  having  permanent  personnel  and  only operated 
by  means  of part-time  rescue  brigade• attached to  the 
mines. A.  ORGANISATION  OF  MINE  RESCUE  SERVICES 
Position as at  s  31.12.1966  2.  Catalogue  of eguipment  including closed-circuit breathing apparatus 
operating for a  period of at least  two  hours 
Country  German  Federal Republic  France  Belgium  Italy  Netherlands 
United  Total 
Nord/Pas- Charleroi  Kingdom 
Coalfield  Ruhr  Aachen  Saar  de-Calais  Lorraine  Borinage  llamur  LUge  Cam pine  Sulci&  Limburg 
(1)  (2)  (')  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (e)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (1,)  (14) 
Type  of apparatus 
958  74  263  128  26  14  22  84  42  106  - 1 717  - a)  Drlger  BG  160  A 
b)  Drlger BG  170/400  675  22  - - - - 10  6  40  9  - - 762 
c)  Drlger  BG  172  707  19  29  - 37  19  26  20  14  - 48  - 919 
d)  Drlger 174  - - - - 61  - - - 2  - - - 73 
e)  Auer  MR  II/,2  76  2  - - - - - - - - 10  - 146 
t) Auer  MR  54/400  46  1  - - - - - - - - 68  - 47 
g)  Auer  J4R  56/400  41  1  - - - - - - - - - - 42 
00 
h)  Fenzy  56  - - - 400  13  - - .,..  5  - - - 418 
-
i) Pirelli 45  - - - - - - - - 2  - - - 2 
.1)  BBM  Aerecheon  - - - - - 2  - - 2  - - - 4 
k)  BBK  Aerophor  - - - - - - - - - - - 220  220 
1)  Proto  - - - - - - - - 2  - - 814  816 
111)  Savoz  - - - - - - - - 2  - - 161  163 
n)  Normalair  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
o)  Aerorlox  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'l'ota1  2 503  119  292  400  239  47  50  48  153  51  232  1 195  5 329 
Per group of 100 
41.8  46.1  rescue  men  54·8  )8.0  41.0  60.6  42.3  38.8  19.2  24.2  54-4  320  35.9 B.  NUMBER  OF  RESCUE  OPERATIONS  PERFORMED  BY  MEN  WEARING 
Years  1965  and  1966 
CLOSED-CIRCUIT  BREATHING  APPARATUS 
Cause  Firedamp or dust  Outburst of  Pit fires  Underground  Opening-up of  Miscellaneous  Total  natural gas  combustion  stoppings  causes 
Coalfield  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a}+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  o}+++ 
(1)  (2)  (?I)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (a)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18}  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22) 
1. Ruhr  3  4  75  9  ___  g_3  2  15  -~-2~~  ---~L 
8  931  14  1311  22  1  197  5  91  20  042 
------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ -----· ------
2.  Aachen  22  1  5  2  27 
------------------------- ------ -----· ------ ,.  Saar  1  5  2  13  1  8  6  115  4  35  14  176 
4·  GERMANY  3  5  80  9  133  2  18  8 430  28  8  939  20  1 426  27  1  237  5  107  20  245 
5o  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  1  10  1  5  1  9  2  16  1  10  1  8  86  2  13  136 
------------------------- ------ ------- ------· ------· ------ ------r------ ------1------ ------ ------ ----- ------
6.  Lorraine  10  3  38  4  48 
1·  FRANCE  1  10  1  5  9  3  26  4  48  8  86  2  17  184  <!  ... 
e.  l!orinage  2  1  8  2  1  8  c.o 
1-------------------------- -----· ------· ------· ------ ------ ------ ------ ------------· ------ ------ ----- ------ ------1------ ------
9·  Cbarleroi-Namur  1  5  2  ----~1 
1  2  32 
1-------------------------- ----- ------ ------ ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------
10.  LUge  4  4  4  8  4 
-------------------------- ------ ------ ----- ------
11.  Cam pine  1  10  1  10 
12.  BELGIUM  1  5  2  7  39  5  10  3  12  54 
1,.  ITALY  (Su1cis) 
14  NETHERLANDS 
•  (Limburg) 
15.  UNITED  KINGDOM  2  786  1  5  9  1 497  5  231  17  2 519 
16.  COMMUNITY  +  5  7  881  2  17  177  2  20  UNITED  KINGDOM  8 444  40  0 461  24  1 475  1  45  1564  10  153  23  002 
a)+  •  Rescue  of personnel. 
b)++  •  Rescue  of materials. 
c)+++  •  Number  of air-purifying cartridges used in these operations. v'  10 
C.  ACCIDENTS  TO  RESCUE  MEN  DUE  TO  THE  WEARING  OF  GAS-MASKS 
1965  and  1966 
, 
Serious  accidents  During practice 
C 0  A L F  I  E L D 
not fatal  fatal  not fatai  fatal 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1.  Ruhr  - - - -
2.  Aachen  - - - -
3.  Saar  - - - -
4·  GERMANY  - - - -
5·  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  - - - -
6. Lorraine  - - - -
1·  FRANCE  - - - -
a.  Borinage  - - - -
9.  Charleroi-Namur  - - - -
10.  Liege  - - 4  -
11.  Cam pine  - - 5'  -
12.  BELGIUM  - - 9  -
13.  ITALY  (Sulcis)  - - - -
14.  NETHERLANDS  (Limburg)  - - - -
15.  UNITED  KINGDOM  1  - 4  -
COMMUNITY  + 
l6. UNITED  KINGDOM 
1  - 13  -v,  11 
D.  COMMENTS,  SUPPLEMENTARY  INFORMATION,  AND  PRINCIPAL 
CHANGES  COMPARED  WITH  1963  and  1964 
I •  GERMAN  FEDERAL  REPUBL I.C 
1.  Essen-Kray  Rescue  StatioQ 
(a)  ReA  1.  Rescue  Stations and  Rescue  Parties 
Owing  to pit closures  and  the reorganisation of rescue brigades,  the  number  of 
rescue stations administered by  the  main  station at Essen  has  fallen  to 82, 
but  the  number  of  rescue  men  has  not  been  reduced  in the  same  proportion, 
When  new  mines  regulations  came  into  force  for  the  "Oberberg~mter" pits of 
Bonn  and Dortmund,the previous  rescue regulations were  replaced by  a  "rescue 
plan"  and  new  instructions were  also  issued to rescue  workers. 
The  decrease  in  the  number  of  rescue stations has  also meant  a  reorganisation 
of  the  first-aid arrangements.  The  central rescue station drafted  a  new  "first-
aid plan  for  rescue  work"  which  was  published  in 1966. 
(b)  Re  B:  Number  of operations 
There  was  no  drop  in  the  number  of operations during  the  two  years  under  review, 
but  the percentage of operations  in connection with  fires  and  explosions  shows 
a  decline.  Many  operations were  concerned with  the  inspection and  opening-up 
of  stoppings of  fire  zones,  with outburst of  natural  gas  or with  the  presence 
of  noxious  atmospheres. 
Some  fires reached exceptional proportions,  particularly in  1965. 
An  explosion,which occurred while  one  fire was  being  fought,  killed nine miners, 
six of  whom  were  members  of  a  rescue  brigade,  while  five  others were  seriously 
injured. 
At  another  fire  fumes  caused  the  death  of  two  miners  who  were  unable  to es-
cape  in  time. 
All  these operations are  the subject of extensive  comments  in  the  annual  reports 
published by  the  Essen  Rescue  Station.  These  reports are regularly sent  to  mem-
bers of  the  Working Party  for  information. 
(c)  Re  C:  Accidents  to rescuers  due  to  the wearing of  gas  masks 
In  1965  and  1966,  no  accidents occurred to rescue workers  equipped with breath-
ing apparatus. 
(d)  Research  and  development  results 
Breathing apparatus 
The  official examination of  the  new  closed-circuit  Dr~ger apparatus,  model  BG 
174,  was  concluded at the  Essen  Rescue  Station.  All  German  "Oberberg~mter" 
have  authorised  the  underground  and surface use  of  this apparatus  which  was 
approved  by  the  "Deutscher Ausschuss  fttr  das  Grubenrettungswesen". 
After this organisation had  duly  examined  the oxygen-operated  SSR  16  B  self-
rescuer manufactured by  the Auer  Company,  this apparatus  was  approved  as  an 
escape  device  for  use  in mines  other  than  coalmines  and  as  an "auxiliary 
apparatus  for  trained rescue  brigades''.  The  oxygen-operated self-rescuer v,  12 
Oxy  SR  45  manufactured  by  Messrs.  Drttger  has  also  been  approved  by  the  "Deut-
scher Ausschuss  fttr  das  Grubenrettungswesen"  as  a  surface  and  underground  es-
cape  device  and  as  an  "auxiliary apparatus  for  trained rescue  brigades". 
During  the  period under  review,  work  continued  on  the  research project  for  the 
improvement  of physiological  conditions of wearers of breathing apparatus,  a 
joint undertaking of  the  Institut Physiologique  of  the  University of Liege  and 
the  Hasselt Central  Rescue  Station which  is subsidised by  the High Authority. 
CO  filter self-rescuer 
The  first filter self-rescuers fitted with  a  heat  exchanger  have  been  put  into 
operation by  pits administered  by  the  Essen Rescue  Station. 
In  1965  and  1966,  filter self-rescuers were  used  as  an  escape  measure  in ten 
cases of  fire  and  explosion  by  a  total of 303  miners. 
The  mining authorities have  instructed the  Essen  Rescue  Station  to  test  the 
effects of  the  decomposition  by  fire of synthetic materials on  filter self-
rescuers.  A  special testing unit  has  been  devised  for  these tests. 
Control of fires  and  underground  combustion 
A  new  material  known  as  "Dimmer"  for  packing fire  dams  has  had  a  good  reception. 
"Dflmmer"  replaces  the mixture  of  rockdust  and  cement  hitherto used.  The  mate-
rial has  also  been  successfully used  for  injecting cement  into  dams  and  road-
way  sides and  roofs. 
After exhaustive tests,  plaster is now  also being used  for  injection work.  This 
method  has  produced  some  particularly good  results because  the plaster sprayed 
on  the  roadway  has  good  sealing characteristics,  and  because it can,  within 
a  short  time,  be  reinforced with slurry for  improving  the  seal. 
The  Essen  Rescue  Station took part  in  a  large  number  of fire trials in  the 
Tremonia  experimental mine,  their object  being to  throw  light  on  the behaviour 
of synthetic materials  and  fires  in  a  descending ventilation system. 
2.  Friedrichsthal/Saar Rescue  Station 
(a)  The  following  rules and  regulations relating to  rescue  work  and  underground 
fire prevention have  been either revised or reissued: 
- Service regulations  for  fire  deputies,  21.6.1965; 
Principles for  the planning and  execution of rescue  operations  in coalmines, 
29.6.1965; 
- Main  rescue  plan for  the  "Oberbergamt" district of  Saarbrucken,  20.10.1965; 
- Regulations  and Directives on  underground  firefighting,  issued by  the  Saar-
brucken  "Oberbergamt",  4.11.1965; 
- Directives on  the use  of filter self-rescuers,  issued by  the  Saarbrucken 
"Oberbergamt",  22.11.1965. 
(b)  The  work  of fitting all Saarbergwerke  AG  return shafts with  CO  measuring 
and  warning  equipment  was  completed during  the period under  review.  A  large-
scale experiment  was  begun with  underground  CO  measuring  and  warning equipment. 
(c)  As  a  precaution against  concealed mine  fires,  the  present  fire regulations 
specify that,  in the  case  of  long-wall  advancing working with  the  caving system, 
the  roadway  barriers to  be  made  along  the  top  and  bottom roads  should  be  seal-
ed  by  sandbags parallel to  the  roadway  axis.  After several satisfactory trials, 
this sandbag seal was  replaced  by  an  insulating foamed  seal.  Under  these  con-
ditions of use,  this material  gave  good  results. v'  13 
(d)  Rapid water  barriers were  introduced  in all mines  to replace  the  former 
rapid stonedust barriers set up  for  the protection of  teams  engaged  on sealing 
work  where  an  explosion hazard exists. 
(e)  The  annual  reports  for  1965  and  1966,  published by  the  Saarbergwerke AG. 
Rescue  Station on  mine  rescue operations and  firefighting,  have  been distrib-
uted  to  the  experts of  the  Working Party on  Rescue Arrangements.  These  reports 
give detailed supplementary  information  on  the problems  discussed  in paragraphs 
A,  B  and  C  of the present Report. v'  14 
II.  BELGIUM 
1.  Hasselt  Rescue  Co-ordination Centre 
(a)  Re  A  (1):  Rescue  Stations and  Rescue  Workers 
Compared  with  the position on  31  December  1964,  the  number  of  rescue  men  fell 
by  77  owing  to  the  closure of  one  pit and  the amalgamation  of  two  others. 
The  number  of  rescue stations will  not  be  reduced  to six until  1  January  1967. 
(b)  Re  B:  Number  of operations 
Operations carried out  for  "various reasons"  were  what  may  be  called surveys 
made  in  1965  under  difficult environmental  conditions  in  a  mine  situated in 
the  Campine  coalfield. 
(c)  Re  C:  Accidents  to rescuers  due  to  the  wearing of  gas  masks 
During practice with  a  breathing apparatus of  the  "Aerolux"  type,  the  oxygen 
reserve  was  used up  before  the practice ended.  The  latter consisted of preli-
minary  psychological  tests and  lasted altogether  120 mins.  It seems  that  the 
apparatus  had  been filled too  soon with  liquid oxygen. 
To  avoid  a  repetition of such  accidents,  the officials in charge  have  been 
instructed to fill this type  of apparatus  immediately prior to use.  The  fact 
that the  amount  of reserve  liquid oxygen  cannot  be  checked  is obviously  a 
serious  drawback. 
(d)  Research  and  development  work  on  national  and  international levels was 
continued during  the  period under  review.  Particular interest attaches to: 
(i)  joint work  on  improving  the physiological conditions for  wearers of 
breathing apparatus  (cf.  D.  1.1 d); 
(ii)  trials connected with  flame  propagation at the surface of  a  powdered 
urethane seal applied  to  roadway  walls  in order  to  extend  the  use  of 
foamed  urethane  in underground workings; 
(iii)  regular,  prolonged trials with  a  large  number  of rescue  men  in an  ex-
perimental  roadway  of  the Hasselt Co-ordination Centre  for  the purpose 
of defining,  on  the  basis of results obtained criteria for  the selection 
of  rescue  men  in charge  of  rescue operations  in unfavourable  environ-
mental  conditions. 
2.  Glain Rescue  Station  (Liege  coalfield) 
(a)  Re  B:  Number  of operations 
The  operations referred to  in column  6  were  carried out  in the  pump  room  for 
the  purpose  of evacuating  CH4.  The  four  operations referred to  in column  18 
relate to  the  sealing of  a  stopping by  spraying plaster with  a  plaster lance 
designed  by  the  rescue  station,  and  with  a  cement  injector. 
(b)  Re  C:  Accidents  to rescuers  due  to  the wearing of  gas  masks 
Regarding  the  four  non-fatal accidents referred to  in column 4,  it will  be 
noted that: 
1.  During  the  period  in question,  the  rescue  men  took part  in 202  4-hour 
practice operations using  a  closed-circuit apparatus  fitted with  lime 
charges  regenerated  by  a  special distributor at  the  rescue  station. 
In  two  cases,  the operations had  to  be  discontinued after 3  l/2  and  3  3/4 
hours  respectively owing  to  the  charges  becoming  clogged.  After  they were v'  15 
opened,  it was  found  that  during regeneration one  screen had  been  given  a 
double  charge of  lime  and  another  vibrating screen had  been omitted.  When 
the charge  and  seal were  subsequently  checked  they were  found  to  be  in order. 
Although  these  defects only  represent  1%  of  the  charges  used  for  4  hours, 
they  emphasise  the  importance  of filling the  charges correctly.  No  similar 
defect was  found  during 2,753  one- or  two-hour  practice operations  in 1965 
and  1966. 
2.  The  inhaling valve  of  a  closed-circuit DrUger  apparatus of  the  172  types 
did  not  function properly  (mica  splintering)  during  a  practice operation. 
The  operation was  then  discontinued  owing  to  accumulation of co2 • 
This  incident  shows  how  important  it is to  check  valve  operation,  both 
when  the apparatus  and  equipment  is being prepared  for  use  and,  above  all 
during use,  with  the  same  frequency  as  during rest periods  (external  con-
dition,  tightness,  connections,  etc.). 
3.  Although  Messrs.  DrUger  have  improved  the  thoric joint connecting the 2-
litre flask  to  the  pressure-reducing valve of  the  closed-circuit apparatus 
type  172,  the  joint is still unreliable  and  the  same  unexpected  leakages 
occur. 
The  rescue  station's view  is that this is mainly  due  to  the  flask  being 
badly situated with  respect  to  the  pressure-reducing valve.  The  locking 
valve  should  be  placed  in exactly  the  same  axis  as  that of  the  pressure-
reducing valve. 
A  standby  thoric joint is attached to  each  172-type apparatus,  near  the 
connection,  so  that  any  such  mishap  can  be  speedily remediedo 
(c)  Results  of  research  and  development  work 
(i)  Plaster  lance 
The  rescue  station has  developed  a  plaster  lance  which  can  be  dis-
mantled.  This  device  was  successfully employed  during trials at our 
Station and  for  the  sealing work  referred to  above. 
(ii)  Latex  sealing 
After  many  studies,  the  station was  successful  in developing  a  latex 
formula  known  as "latex  F  32"  which  can  be  manufactured safely and 
rapidly at  a  reasonable  cost price  and  only  needs  one  vessel  and  one 
spray  gun. 
The  surface  spraying trials gave  good  results  and  continue  to  be 
satisfactory as  regards  adhesion  and tightnesso COMPOSITION  AND  MEETINGS  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  AND  ITS  WORKING  PARTIES 
(AS  AT  31.12.67) 
ANNEX  VI A.- MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
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Frillendorferstr.  351 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter .des  Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau und  Energie, 
4630 Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
Technical  Advisers 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  PALM,  Ministerium fUr Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und Verkehr 
des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  HUBNER,  Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft,  Ministe-
rium fur  Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft,  66  SaarbrUcken,  Hardenbergstr.  8 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur Generaal  van het  Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van econOmische 
Zaken  en Energie,  24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles 4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur  g~n~ral des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires  ~conomiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
Employers'  Representat1ve 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du Centre de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewit-Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  THOMAS,  Secr~taire national de  la Centrale syndicale des travailleurs des  usines 
de  Belgique,  16,  impasse  Pirnay,  Grace-Berleur 
Technical  Advisers 
L.  BOULET,  Directeur  g~n~ral du  Fonds  national de retraite des  ouvriers mineurs, 
Ministere du travail et de  la pr~voyance sociale,  6,  place  St~phanie, Bruxelles VI,  4 
M.  THOMASSEN,  President  national de  la Centrale des francs-mineurs,  145,  rue Belliard, 
Bruxelles 
FRANCE 
Government  Representatives 
A.  REBIERE,  Ingenieur  en chef,  chef  du service de  !'hygiene et de  la securite dans 
les mines,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere de  l'industrie,  97,  rue  de Grenelle, 
75-Paris  7e 
L.  KOCH,  Ingenieur  en  chef  des mines,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere de  l'industrie, 
97,  rue  de Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  PROUST,  Directeur general des  services techniques  des  charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Be 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des syndicats chretiens des mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris  5e 
Technical  Advisers 
J.  POREBSKI,  247,  bd  de  la Victoire,  Annequin  (Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Government  Representatives 
Dott.  Consigliere B.  COLUCCI,  Direzione generale dell'emigrazione,  Ministero degli 
affari esteri,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  M.  MARRA,  Ispettore generale delle miniere,  Ministero dell'industria e 
commercio,  via Veneto 33,  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto Arte Mineraria della  facolta d'Ingegneria,  Piazza d'Armi, 
Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  Segretario generale della Federestrattive,  via  Isonzo 42,  Roma 
Technical  Advisers 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  Ispettore generale del Ministero del  lavoro e  della previdenza 
sociale,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
Dott.  R.  PURPURA,  Direttore generale al Ministero del  lavoro,  via Flavia 6,  Roma LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representatives 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Ingenieur-directeur du travail et des  mines,  inspection du travail et 
des mines,  19,  av.  Gaston Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  RAUS,  Directeur a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
Workers'  Representative 
VI,  5 
N.  PASCOLINI,  President  de  la delegation ouvriere d'Arbed-Mines,  90,  rue des  Fleurs, 
Schiff  lange 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  Representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  Inspecteur-generaal der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Drs.  D.C.  VANDERHOOFT,  Hoofd  van  de Directie Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken,  Bezuidenhoutseweg  30,  's-Gravenhage 
Employers'  Representative 
Ir.  G.B.  DEBETS,  Directeur,  Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Workers'  Representative 
J.M.  WEIJERS,  Vice-Voorzitter  van  de  Nederlandse  Katholieke  Mijnwerkersbond, 
Seringenstraat  9 ter,Passart-Zuid 
Technical  Adviser 
H.L.  GROND,  Katholieke Vereniging van  Mijnbeambten,  Schelsberg 202,  Heerlerheide  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  Representative 
H.S.  STEPHENSON,  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines,  Ministry of  Power,  7  Millbank,  Thames 
House,  London  S.W.l 
Employers'  Representative 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLET,  Deputy  Director-General of  Production,  National Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.l VI,  6 
Workers'  Representative 
S.  BULLOUGH,  Vice-President  of  the National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  c/o Miners' 
Offices,  Barnsley  I  Yorkshire 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANISATION,  GENEVA 
A representative of  the  International Labour Office sitting as  an  observer. 
B.- RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
The  Restricted Committee  consists of  the Government  members  of  the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission. 
C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  QUESTIONS 
I.  Working  Party on Electrification 
- Members  of  the  Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Oberbergamtsdirektor G.  EPPING,  Oberbergamt,  46  Dortmund,  Goebenstr.  25-27 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (1),  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a  !'Administration des mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4. 
G.J.A.  COOLS,  Divisiedirecteur van het  Mijnwezen,  24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot, Bruxelles  4 
FRANCE 
R.  COEUILLET,  Ingenieur en  chef  au service exploitation des  charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  8e 
P ..  FLINOIS,  Houilleres du  bassin du  Nord et  du Pas-de-Calais,  service technique du 
fond,  20,  rue des  Minimes,  Douai/Nord 
(1)  Chairman  of  the Working  Party  as  representative of  the  RestrictedCommittee. ITALY 
Dott.  Ing.  c.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  Vice-Direttore della Miniera di Seruci,  Casella 
postale  117,  Carbonia  (Cagliari) 
LUXEMBOURG 
VI, 
E.  MULLER,  Ingenieur des  mines  a la division des  mines  de  l'ARBED,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  E.A.R.  HOEFNAGELS,  Inspecteur der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
P.H.  GIESBERTZ,  p/a Staatsmijn Emma/Hendrik te Hoensbroek,  Hoensbroek/Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
D.E.  FOX,  H.M.  Principal Electrical Inspector of  Mines  and Quarries,  Thames  House, 
Millbank,  London  s.w.  1 
- Experts  on  cables  and  leads 
H.  GOBBE,  Directeur  a  la division cdblerie des  A.C.E.C.,  Charleroi 
M.  OSTY,  Directeur technique a  la societe industrielle de  liaisons electriques, 
64bis,  rue  de  Monceau,  Paris  Be 
F.  VIN,  Ingenieur  au  CERCHAR,  Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Y.  EYRAUD,  Chef  du  laboratoire d'etudes generales des  cdbles  de  Lyon,  170,  avenue 
Jean-Jaures,  Lyon  (Rh6ne) 
Ir.  F.  GOEDBLOED,  Nederlandse  Kabelfabriek,  Delft 
Ir.  W.L.  BAER,  N.V.  Hollandse Draad- en  Kabelfabriek,  Amsterdam 
II.  Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements  and  on Fires and UndergroundCombustion 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER  (1),  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand 
und  Verkehr,  Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dipl.  Berging.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,Schonscheidtstr.  28 
A.  VAN  GEMBER,  Erster Bergrat  a.D.,  Direktor der Grubensicherheitsabteilung der 
Saarbergwerke  AG,  66  SaarbrUcken,  Trierer Strasse  1 
(1)  Chairman of  the Working  Party  as  representative of  the RestrictedCommittee VI,  8 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  PALM,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr, 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur  du  centre national beige de  coordination des  centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue  Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du  centre de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
Kempische  Steenweg  555,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
FRANCE 
R.  GRISARD,  Ingenieur  des  mines,  charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  75  -
Paris  Be 
G.  ROGEZ,  Directeur du  poste central de  secours des  mines  du  Nord  et  du  Pas-de-
Calais,  rue  du  Bois,  Lens  (Pas-de-Calais) 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  BELLE-ROCHE,  57-
Merle  bach 
R.  BROUAT,  Ingenieur  en  chef,  chef  des  services generaux  du  fond  aux  houilleres des 
Cevennes,  30 - Ales 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Dipl.-ing.,  ingenieur civ.  des  mines  a  l'ARBED,  23,  rue General  Patton, 
Esch-sur-Alzette 
ITALY 
Prof.  Ing.  P.  PIGA,  Titolare della cattedra di Arte  Mineraria della facolta di 
Ingegneria di  Roma,  via Eusossiana,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  C.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  Vice-Direttore della Miniera di Seruci,  Casella 
postale  117,  Carbonia 
Dott.  Ing.  G.  FORTE,  Distretto minerario,  via c.  Battisti 10,  Trieste 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  w.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus 65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  L.P.A.  VAN  POL,  Chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst,  p/a ORANJE-NASSAU  MIJNEN, 
Heerlen  (L.) VI,  9 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT,  Deputy  Director-General  of  Production,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.  1 
lo  Experts  on  Aspects  of Fires in Deep  Shafts 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH,  46  Dort-
mund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.-Ing.  K.  RENNER,  Forschungsstelle der Grubenbewetterung des  Steinkohlenberbau-
vereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Frillendorferstr.  351 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  W.  SCHMIDT,  Westfalische Berggewerkschaftskasse,  Prllfstelle fUr  Gruben-
bewetterung,  4630 Bochum,  Herner  Strasse 43 
BELGIUM 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur du  centre national belge de  coordination des  centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue  Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du centre de  coordination de  sauvetage du bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
J.  BRACKE,  Ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national des  mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Pdturages 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut d'hygiene des  mines,  Havermarkt, 
Hasselt 
H.  CALLUT,  Directeur et  ingenieur  en  chef  a l'Institut national des mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Plturages 
FRANCE 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
R.  LOISON,  Directeur des  groupes  de  recherches,  CERCHAR,  35,  rue Sainte Dominique, 
Paris 7e 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Dr.  W.  DE  BRAAF,  Directeur van  het  Centraal Proefstation voor  de  Staatsmijnen in 
Limburg,  Trebeek  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Prof.  van  de Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus 65,  Heerlen  (L.) VI,  10 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.S.  EISNER,  Ministry  of  Power,  Safety in Mines  Research Establishment,  Harpur 
Hill,  Buxton  (Derbyshire) 
2.  Experts  on Fire-Resistant Fluids 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das  Grubenrettungswesen des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  chem.  H.W.  THOENES,  Hauptabteilungsleiter,  Technischer Dberwachungsverein  e.V., 
43  Essen,  Steubenstr.  53 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH,  46  Dort-
mund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  MALORNY,  Direktor des  Pharmakologischen Instituts der Universitat 
Hamburg,  2  Hamburg 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  C.A.  PRIMAVESI,  Hygiene-Institut  des  Ruhrgebietes,  4650 Gelsenkirchen, 
Rotthauserstr.  19 
BELGIUM 
E.  DEMELENNE,  Administrateur-directeur de  l'Institut national des mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Pdturages 
J.  BRACKE,  Ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national des  mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Pdturages 
Dr.  J.  CRISPOUX,  2,  rue Potresse,  Wasmes 
FRANCE 
R.  LEFEVRE,  Ingenieur des  mines,  3,  rue  Louis-Rolland,  Montrouge  (Seine) 
G.  BLANPAIN,  Ingenieur au  centre d'etudes et recherches  des  charbonnages  de  France, 
Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Dr  J.J.  JARRY,  Medecin-chef  des  charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  Be 
Dr  c.  CLAEYS,  houilleres du  bassin du  Nord  et  du  Pas-de-Calais,  centre d'etudes 
medicales minieres,  129-133,  avenue  Salengro,  Sin-le-Noble 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
H.  ITALIE,  Arts,  inspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht der mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 3.  Experts  on Ventilation 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Berging.  W.  BOTH,  Hauptstelle filr  das Grubenrettungswesen des  Steinkohlenberg-
bauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
VI,  11 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  W.  SCHMIDT,  Prilfstelle filr  Grubenbewetterung,  4630 Bochum,  Hernerstr.  45 
Dr.-Ing.  R.  GREUER,  Forschungsstelle  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  43  Essen-Kray,  Frillen-
dorferstr.  351 
BELGIUM 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a  !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut d'hygiene  des  mines,  Havermarkt  22, 
Hasselt 
FRANCE 
G.  CHAMPAGNAC,  Directeur aux  houilleres du  bassin de  Lorraine,  direction des  etudes 
et  des  travaux neufs,  Merlebach  (Moselle) 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
E.  SIMODE,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  houilleres du bassin de  Lorraine,  direction des 
etudes et  des  travaux neufs,  Petite-Rosselle  (Moselle) 
NETHERLANDS 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
III. Working  Party  on Winding  Ropes  and Shaft Guides 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing  H.  ARNOLD,  Leiter der Seilprllfstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschafts-
kasse,  4630 Bochum,  Dinnendahlstr.  9 
Dipl.  Ing.  M.  RIEGER,  Leiter der  SeilprUfstelle der Saarbergwerke  AG,  66  SaarbrUcken, 
Trierer Str.  1 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a  !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 VI,  12 
J.  STREBELLE,  Directeur,  association des  industriels de  Belgique  (A.I.B.),  29,  avenue 
A.  Drouart,  Auderghem 
FRANCE 
P.  BLOMART,  Ingenieur en  chef,  service exploitation des  charbonnages  de  France,  9, 
av.  Percier,  Paris  Be 
C.  ROGEZ,  Directeur  du  poste central de  secours,  Nord  et Pas-de-Calais,  rue  du  Bois, 
Lens  (Nord) 
ITALY 
Prof.  Dott.  Ing.  C.  MORTARINO,  Istituto di meccanica applicata del politecnico di 
Torino,  corso Duca  degli  Abruzzi  24,  Torino 
Prof.  Dott.  Ing.  L.  STRAGIOTTI,  Direttore dell'istituto di arte mineraria del poli-
tecnico di Torino,  via s. Quintina 42,  Torino 
LUXEMBOURG 
E.  MULLER,  Ingenieur des  mines  a la division des  mines  luxembourgeoises  a 
l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS  (1),  Inspecteur-generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  F.H.  SMULDERS,  Laura en Vereeniging,Eygelshoven  (L.) 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
G.K.  GREENOUGH,  Head,  Mechanical  Engineering Section,  Ministry  of  Power,  Safety in 
Mines  Research  Establishment,  Red  Hill,  Off  Broad  Lane,  Sheffield 3 
- Experts  on  Winding  Ropes 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  H.  GRUPE,  Seilprllfstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschaftskasse,  4630 
Bochum,  Dinnendahlstr.  9 
FRANCE 
M.P.  SIDO,  Directeur de  !'association des  industriels de  France,  10,  rue de  Calais, 
Paris  9e 
A.  BURGUN,  Ingenieur a !'association des  industriels de  France,  10,  rue  de  Calai$, 
Paris 9e 
(1)  Chairman  of  the Working  Party as representative of the Restricted Committee VI,  13 
IV.  Working  Party on Combustible  Dusts 
GERMANY 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  HUEBNER,  Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft  des 
Ministeriums  fUr  Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft  des  Saarlandes,  66  Saarbrllcken, 
Hardenbergstr. 
Dipl.-Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.-Ing.  A.  STEFFENHAGEN,  Geschaftsfllhrer der Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
46  Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau und  Energie,  4630 Bochum, 
Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general des  mines,  Ministere des affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
E.  DEMELENNE,  Administrateur directeur de  l'institut national des mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Plturages 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur  du  centre de  coordination des  moyens  de sauvetage de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
FRANCE 
G.  SCHNEIDER  (1),  Ingenieur general des  mines,  Ministere de  l'industrie,  97,  rue de 
Grenelle,  Paris 7e 
A.  REBIERE,  Ingenieur  en chef,  chef  du service de  l'hygiene et de  la securite mi-
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